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The factional foundations of
Competition Policy in America
1888-1992
BY JAMES MAY*
Professor Rudolph J.R. Peritz's remarkable new book, Competi-
tion Policy in America 1888-1992,1 innovatively examines the
interrelated development of a series of highly important fields of
American law over the last 100 years. The book provocatively
examines the way in which key changes not only in antitrust law,
but also in labor law, corporate law, and First Amendment
jurisprudence all have reflected and helped to shape typically
embattled basic beliefs about competition, property rights, effi-
ciency, liberty, and equality in the United States.
The book's virtues are by no means limited to the specialized
insights it offers with regard to each of the major areas it exam-
ines. Professor Peritz ties each of the legal areas he explores to
larger changes over time in American economic life, culture, poli-
tics, and ideology. At the same time, he highlights the need to
consider the parallels, contrasts, and interconnections among the
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developments that occurred within each of these diverse fields,
fields that typically have been explored too much in isolation
from one another. The particular approach that Professor Peritz
takes in this multifield examination is creative and, indeed,
unique among scholarly examinations of the last century of com-
petition law in America. His approach constantly challenges read-
ers to rethink well-established understandings of American legal
and cultural evolution and to reconsider the implications of that
evolution for practice and possibilities in our own time.
What Professor Peritz offers us, specifically, is a "rhetorical
history of competition policy" 2 broadly understood. In doing so,
he connects his study in at least a general way not only to the
work of Michel Foucault, but also, for example, to the extensive
recent scholarship exploring the nature and impact of such
"rhetorics" or "languages of discourse" as classical republicanism
and liberalism in late 18th- and 19th-century America. 3
Professor Peritz's book grows out of but goes very substan-
tially beyond his earlier articles exploring competition and prop-
erty rhetorics in antitrust law.4 In those articles, Peritz sought to
challenge more narrowly focused understandings of antitrust tra-
dition and logic that had become prevailing orthodoxy by the late
1980s. In particular, he disputed judicial, enforcement, and schol-
arly beliefs that the sole concern of antitrust law is to preserve
marketplace competition.5 Peritz took issue with Chicago school
2 Id. at8.
3 See id. at 8 n.7.
4 Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 263 [hereinafter Peritz, Counter-History]; Rudolph J. Peritz, A Gene-
ology of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTInGs L.J. 511 (1989) [here-
inafter Peritz, Geneology]; Rudolph J. Peritz, The Predicament of
Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the Monopolization of Price
Discrimination Argument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205; Rudolph J. Peritz, The
"Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of
Competition, 40 HASTINGs L.J. 285 (1989) [hereinafter Peritz, "Rule of
Reason "].
- See Peritz, Counter-History, supra note 4; Peritz, Geneology,
supra note 4; Peritz, "Rule of Reason, " supra note 4.
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efforts to marginalize earlier legislative and judicial expressions
of concern for small business welfare. He especially challenged
the Chicago school attempt to oust such "property" concerns from
the antitrust field as a claimed necessary step to promote the
coherence and intellectual respectability of antitrust law.6 In these
prior articles, Peritz focused substantially, but by no means exclu-
sively, on early antitrust history. He sought to demonstrate that
the historical interpretations he challenged told only half the story
of what antitrust law has been about since its beginnings.
7
Professor Peritz begins his new, much more sweeping study by
noting how pervasively in America images of "free competition"
influence social theories, activity, and public debate in such
diverse realms as business, politics, sports, and public speech. He
immediately points out, however, the fundamental ambiguity that
inheres in this key concept. He emphasizes that persistent strug-
gles have been waged over which threats to free competition
should be emphasized: those posed by government or those posed
by private economic power. Peritz stresses that an emphasis on
each of these threats, respectively, has implicated a related com-
mitment to one of a pair of basic American ideals. While belief in
competition freed from government regulation "has supported a
commitment to individual liberty,"8 belief in competition freed
from private economic power "has involved a commitment to
rough equality."9 Competition policy over time, however, he
relates, has not been informed solely by "these twin rhetorics of
free competition" reflecting commitments to liberty and equality,
respectively. It also has been informed, he notes, by private prop-
erty rights concerns and conceptions.' 0
Peritz argues that while the twin rhetorics of free competition
are not necessarily contradictory, they repeatedly have been in
6 See, e.g., Peritz, Counter-History, supra note 4, at 265, 268.
7 See, e.g., Peritz, "Rule of Reason, " supra note 4, at 287, 288.
8 PErTz, supra note 1, at 3.
9 Id.
10 See id. at 3-4.
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tension with one another over the course of the last hundred years.
Similarly, Peritz believes that recurring friction, but not necessar-
ily antinomy, also has characterized the relationship "between
competition policy and private property rights.""1 Peritz seeks to
understand better the evolution of these patterns and relationships
within the variety of interrelated fields of law he explores, as
these have played out since the late 19th century. As he describes
it, his exploration of competition policy in America
approaches the subject matter as rhetorical confrontations between
factions engaged in public discourse, factions informed by their own
distinctive clusters of ethical commitments and logical connections.
Together, rivalrous rhetorics of free competition have expressed the
ethical and logical grounds, the unstable and sometimes explosive
foundation, for American political economy over the last twelve
decades or so. 2
Peritz stresses that general rhetorics not only shape but are
shaped by material circumstances. He also emphasizes that such
rhetorics do not mechanistically or inexorably determine the spe-
cific positions and outcomes they affect. Indeed, he notes that gen-
eral rhetorical frameworks, or "structures of thought and belief," 13
attain longevity in large part because of their adaptability.14
Nevertheless, Peritz argues that everyone relies on general
structures of thought to understand the world around them.15 As a
consequence, he contends, an historical analysis of influential
general rhetorics can help illuminate not only what persons and
factions in the past intended but the limits of what would have
been imaginable to them. 16 More specifically, Peritz argues that an
historical analysis of the interaction of rivalrous general rhetorics





16 Id. at 5.
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can help to make it clear that American competition policy has
not simply progressed steadily upward since the 1890s through
the continual refinement of careful, consensus reasoning. Instead,
he urges, a history of prevailing rhetoric demonstrates that compe-
tition policy has been "the outcome of struggles and confronta-
tions, both among political or ideological factions and, at another
level, between utopian aspirations and material conditions."
17
Clarification that this has been the dynamic behind the evolution
of current ideas about competition, property rights, efficiency, lib-
erty, and equality, he argues, beneficially reveals such ideas to be
"contestable social and political choices," rather than "products of
(super)natural, historical, economic, or logical necessity."
18
Finally, Peritz notes that such a new examination of the ideologi-
cal struggles waged over competition policy in the past can
produce
a re-collection of the forgotten voices, rejected dissenting opinions,
declined positions, and disparaged theories that were part of those
debates. I want to throw open an archive of counterpolicies and coun-
terarguments, to recall the conflicts engaged in and the alternative
views so fiercely held, views whose appeal continues to inspire debate
about political economy. 19
Competition Policy in America 1888-1992 presents a fresh,
intensive, and densely packed new examination of the record of
competition policy since the late 19th century "formative era" of
American antitrust law. It thoughtfully reconceptualizes the scope
of competition policy to focus on areas of legal thought and
development going well beyond antitrust law itself. At a mini-
mum, this product of formidable effort by Professor Peritz consti-
tutes a valuable, pointed call for us to think in new ways, both
about the totality of American competition policy experience as it
has developed to date and about the insights and implications this
history may present for current policy thinking and action. The
book is likely to spark considerable new scholarly dialog and
17 Id.
18 Id. at 8.
19 Id. at5.
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debate on the specific issues that Professor Peritz raises, not only
among antitrust scholars, but also among such scholars and schol-
ars whose primary focus is on one or more of the various other
substantive fields that Peritz addresses.
Given its highly ambitious scope and its original interpretative
framework, Competition Policy in America 1888-1992 inevitably
raises more important issues than can be discussed exhaustively
or resolved definitively within a single volume. Peritz's own
emphases and analyses suggest intriguing possibilities while still
leaving room for considerable further reflection and debate on a
wide range of issues that his book provocatively poses in a new
way.
This review article focuses on the central theme of Peritz's
book: that competition policy in America from the 1880s to the
1990s has evolved through the continued interplay between two
great opposing rhetorical factions. In examining this core thesis,
this article concentrates on the first third of Peritz's wide-ranging
study. This portion of his work offers a new interpretation of the
legislative, judicial, and theoretical developments leading up to
the transformation of competition policy that accompanied the
New Deal. These initial chapters address the passage of the Sher-
man Act, the Court's jurisprudence from 1890 to the early 1930s,
and the evolution of the general theoretical approaches to compe-
tition policy that rose to prominence during those decades.
Peritz's discussion in these early chapters provides an important
basis for understanding much of the rest of his work. It also pro-
vides much of the foundation on which Peritz rests his ultimate
conclusions about competition policy in America, not only in the
decades before the New Deal, but in our own time as well.
I. The legislative history of the Sherman Antitrust Act
A. A new rhetorical history
Peritz commences his history of competition policy by exam-
ining the congressional debates beginning in 1888 that ultimately
culminated in passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. In his Intro-
Factionalfoundations : 245
duction, Peritz argues that this episode is a logical starting point
for extended analysis because the congressional debates, along
with related opinions voiced at the time in the popular press, con-
stituted the "first extended public debate in America about
competition policy." 20 Peritz argues that the floor debates and
committee reports preceding Sherman Act passage gave birth to
modem competition discourse: "The rhetorical practices [in these
debates and reports] set the terms of debate over political econ-
omy in twentieth century America-debate reflecting two sharply
contrasting views of free competition."
21
Peritz describes the congressional debates as an extended con-
frontation between two strongly divided "rhetorical camps": a
"Sherman faction" and its opposition. Peritz stresses that these
differing factions developed their contrasting views in a context
in which older, classical conceptions of a beneficent social order
premised on liberty of contract, vigorous and open competition,
and limited government increasingly were being called into ques-
tion by the widespread new prevalence of cartelization and tighter
forms of giant combination. Simultaneously, he notes, the worsen-
ing economic situation of small businesses and the ongoing
expansion of the ranks of industrial workers seemed to be eroding
the "rough equality and economic independence" that had been
deemed an essential basis for virtuous government in "republican-
ist" visions of political liberty.
22
Senator Sherman initiated the congressional struggle by intro-
ducing a bill to condemn all arrangements made or tending "to
prevent full and free competition . . . or which tend to advance
the cost to the consumer." 23 Peritz relates, however, that 15
months later, battle between the two contending congressional
factions produced a 31-28 roll call vote referring Sherman's bill
to the Senate Judiciary Committee.2 4 That committee then rapidly
20 Id.
21 Id. at5.
22 Id. at 11,21-24.
23 See id. at 13 (quoting Sherman's antitrust bill).
24 Id. at 13, 14.
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produced a completely different bill that replaced the language
just quoted with common law terminology banning "every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy
in restraint of trade or commerce." 25 Within a week after the Com-
mittee reported out this new bill, the Senate approved it with only
a single dissenting vote.26 Several weeks later, the House unani-
mously approved the Senate bill without change and the bill
became law when signed by President Benjamin Harrison on July
2, 1890.27
Peritz distinguishes the two warring camps he finds to have
been active in the congressional debates on the basis of their
respective reactions to the contemporary rise of expanded
cartelization and new, disturbing forms of tighter, large-scale
combination. While the Sherman faction saw these new develop-
ments as dangerous and unnatural, the opposing camp, says
Peritz, perceived the same developments as part of a naturally
evolving new economic order.28 These differing understandings,
he notes, led to differing assessments of what, if any, new govern-
ment action was needed. Sherman and his allies pushed for gov-
ernment eradication of arrangements that threatened either to
prevent full and free competition or to advance consumer prices.29
Their congressional opponents wanted more limited government
25 S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (as reported by the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, April 2, 1890).
26 The lone dissenter was Senator Blodgett (D. N.J.). See 21 CONG.
REC. 3153 (1890). Blodgett never participated in the Senate discussions
of proposed antitrust legislation and his reason for dissenting remains
obscure. See HANs B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTrTRUST POLICY: ORIGINA-
TION OF AN AMERICAN TRADmON 201 (1955). In his study, Thorelli specu-
lated that Blodgett's lone contrary vote might somehow have resulted
from Blodgett's embrace of the markedly sympathetic general attitude
toward corporations displayed at the time by his home state. See id. at
201 n.87.
27 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)).
28 PERrrz, supra note 1, at 15.
29 Id. at 13, 15, 17.
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protection of competition and greater security for the contracting
freedom that seemingly made development of the evolving new
order possible.30
Peritz relates that only the Sherman faction explicitly invoked
the term "industrial liberty" to make its case in the congressional
debates. 31 Nevertheless, he suggests that the basic disagreements
between the two camps usefully can be understood as emanations
of fundamentally differing interpretations of this phrase. The con-
trasting interpretations of industrial liberty embraced respectively
by the two sides can be conceived, he says, as reflecting either
differing understandings of liberty or, alternatively, differing
underlying impulses-by one camp toward liberty and by the
other camp toward equality.
32
Peritz reports that the aspect or meaning of liberty that the
Sherman faction emphasized was freedom from undue market
power. In contrast, the liberty the opposing faction stressed was
freedom from governmental power and regulation. These differ-
ences, Peritz notes, led to differing regulatory preferences. The
Sherman camp actively sought regulation by legislation. Those
outside that camp wanted to rely more heavily on regulation
through the protection and unimpeded operation of private prop-
erty rights. 33
More specifically, Peritz argues, Sherman and his supporters
wanted to ban private anticompetitive agreements that restrained
the normal leveling force of competition. This, they hoped, would
serve to reestablish and protect the system of competitive rivalry
among roughly equal participants envisioned in "republicanist"
conceptions of industrial liberty. Those who did not share Sher-
man's factional outlook sought instead to leave room for judicial
enforcement of private "remedial" or defensive restraints on eco-
nomic rivalry, perceiving such restraints to be a legitimate and
30 Id. at 16, 17.
31 Id. at 18.
32 Id. at 17.
33 Id.
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appropriate exercise of freedom of contract. The remedial
restraints Sherman's opponents had in mind, Peritz says, were pri-
vate combinations such as defensive cartels established to combat
the excesses either of competition itself, for example, in the form
of "ruinous" competition, or of combination, most particularly in
the form of harmful trust activity.34
If the contending factional interpretations of industrial liberty
alternatively are understood not in terms of differing understand-
ings of liberty, but instead in terms of impulses, respectively,
toward either equality or liberty, Peritz argues, Sherman and his
allies should be seen as the faction impelled toward equality,
while their rhetorical rivals should be seen as the faction more
centrally concerned with liberty. The members of the Sherman
camp, he relates, believed that government protection of unim-
peded competition would promote widespread economic prosper-
ity, which, in turn, would contribute to realization of the
republicanist vision of rough competitive equality. This equality-
oriented vision of "industrial liberty," notes Peritz, left no legiti-
mate place for cartel price fixing.35
The opposing faction's conception of "industrial liberty," how-
ever, informed by an impulse toward liberty instead of toward
equality, did allow room for some price-fixing combinations. The
embrace of such a "liberty-oriented" conception led congressmen
in this camp to seek more limited government regulation of con-
tracts in restraint of trade, in order to allow room for the type of
defensive restraints on rivalry just noted. These congressmen
feared that more sweeping regulation detrimentally might infringe
the freedom of contract critically needed to promote economic
growth and prosperity.36
Peritz notes that notwithstanding such fundamental ideological
differences, the two camps shared some important commonalities.
Both factions centrally hoped for the prevalence of fair prices and
34 Id. at 15-18.
35 Id. at 17.
36 Id.
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profits in the economic system, for the benefit of producers and
consumers alike. Both camps also deemed government interven-
tion in the economy to be appropriate to help achieve this result.
Sherman and his allies wanted to rely, when necessary, upon
active government interdiction of private threats to full and free
marketplace competition as a means to produce such fair levels of
prices and profits. Their rhetorical rivals, however, endorsed a
different pattern of government activity. They supported both pro-
hibition of a more limited range of "excessive" combination activ-
ity and judicial enforcement of those collective restrictions of
rivalry that merely restored the fair prices that had been elimi-
nated either by excesses of competition or by bad forms of combi-
nation engaged in by others.
37
Peritz places great stress on the new language the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee adopted to replace Sherman's original bill. Peritz
argues that this language drew on a long-established common
law tradition rooted in "liberty of contract and private property
rights including the right to a fair profit." 38 He believes this lan-
guage effected a retreat from Sherman's desire to enforce "full
and free competition." 39 The Committee bill's embrace of already-
established, limited common law prohibitions on private restraints
of trade, he urges, reflected a non-Sherman-like desire to inter-
vene only to eliminate "excesses" of both combination and com-
petition, while otherwise leaving the competitive economic
system alone to evolve naturally in a manner that might include
the establishment of "reasonable" private restraints on competi-
tive rivalry.40
Peritz emphasizes, however, that the new bill not only invoked
common law prohibitions, but simultaneously established a vari-
ety of unprecedented and potentially severe remedies for their
violation. Noting that both Houses of Congress adopted the Com-
mittee bill practically unanimously after only a few hours of floor
37 Id.
38 Id. at 20.
39 Id. at 20, 25.
40 See id. at 20-25.
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debate, Peritz concludes that the bill offered a kind of synthesis or
accommodating balance between old common law liability stan-
dards and new remedies. 4' The Sherman Act, he says, "seemed to
be reaching for a middle ground between the rhetorics of indus-
trial liberty and fair price, between their logics of competition
policy and private property rights, and between their statist and
libertarian approaches. '42
B. Assessing the original factional foundations of
American antitrust law
1. WHAT AND WHERE IS A FACTION? The central theme and most
novel contribution of Competition Policy in America 1888-1992
is its depiction of American competition policy over the last hun-
dred years as the product of ongoing interaction between two
great rhetorical factions: one primarily committed to rough equal-
ity, uninhibited competition, and freedom from the dangers posed
by excessive private economic power, and the other primarily con-
cerned to protect freedom from excessive government regulation
and determined to uphold private property rights and contracting
liberty. This central interpretative approach raises basic questions
of methodology and evidence. Two particularly important, interre-
lated questions are: What exactly constitutes a "faction" and how
do we know when one is present and powerfully influencing legal
development in an ongoing struggle with an opposing ideological
camp?
"Faction," of course, could connote a variety of different
things. In some contexts, the word might be used to mean simply
a group of persons who happened to coalesce at a particular
moment to support or to oppose a specific measure identified with
some larger social group, concern, or value. Thus, anyone who
happened to vote for, or to uphold, a particular federal health and
safety measure might be declared part of a "prohealth and safety"
faction or a "nationalist" as opposed to a "states'-rights" faction
or perhaps even a "proregulation" as opposed to a "liberty of
41 Id. at 20, 25-26.
42 Id. at 26.
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contract" faction with regard to that particular measure. The legis-
lators or judges joining together in support of that particular mea-
sure might be so designated despite the fact that they might divide
among themselves on various other federal health and safety
questions and that only some of them, therefore, might be consid-
ered part of the "health and safety" or "nationalist" or "proregula-
tion" faction supporting other particular federal health and safety
measures.
Alternatively, "faction" might be used instead to highlight
ongoing general differences among an institution's members in
their sympathy toward any one of numerous outside groups or
basic values that one might choose to emphasize. In this sense,
congressmen or Supreme Court Justices might be grouped, for
example, into pro- and antilabor factions, or pro- or antibusiness
factions, or pro- or antimajoritarian factions.
"Faction" also might be used in still a third sense to mean a
group having substantial continuity in its membership over time
and distinguished by its members' embrace of a particular shared,
guiding philosophy of a broader sort that is thought to have dif-
fered markedly from the particular shared, guiding philosophy
embraced by those comprising an opposing ideological faction.
Of these three possibilities, 43 the third seems closest to what
Peritz means by "faction." How well does such a "factional"
framework fit the congressional deliberations giving rise to the
Sherman Act?
2. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN ACT Peritz's depic-
tion of the congressional deliberations preceding enactment of the
Sherman Act differs strongly from the varied accounts of these
debates offered by other scholars over the last several decades. In
his landmark work of the mid-1950s, 44 Hans Thorelli, for exam-
ple, concluded that the debates reflected a high degree of philo-
sophical consensus in Congress with regard to the virtues of
43 While these possibilities do not exhaust the range of conceivable
meanings of "faction," they provide a useful starting point for assessing
the picture Peritz presents.
44 THORELLI, supra note 26.
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unrestricted competition. He also found that congressmen in gen-
eral embraced an "economic egalitarianism" incorporating various
major currents of 19th-century thinking. Thorelli concluded that
Congress as a whole sought to promote competition and that its
members were concerned simultaneously with economic opportu-
nity, wealth distribution, efficiency, and political freedom. He fur-
ther believed that while consumers were the ultimate beneficiaries
of the Sherman Act, Congress as a whole likely had small busi-
nesses in mind as the intended immediate beneficiaries.45
William Letwin, in his well-known 1965 book Law and Eco-
nomic Policy in America: The Evolution of the Sherman Antitrust
Act,46 emphasized that congressmen in general, including both
Senator Sherman and the Senate Judiciary Committee members
who replaced Sherman's bill with a provision of their own,
strongly believed in competition but at the same time did not wish
to prohibit all business combinations. 47 Letwin concluded that the
Committee's bill did not reflect any basic philosophical disagree-
ment with Sherman but instead "differed mainly in providing a
greater number of more severe penalties." 48
In both his 1978 book The Antitrust Paradox49 and his earlier
study of the Sherman Act's legislative history,50 Robert Bork, too,
emphasized widespread philosophical consensus among the con-
gressmen who debated antitrust legislation from 1888 to the
middle of 1890. Bork, however, detected in the debates an over-
whelmingly dominant congressional concern for economic effi-
ciency or "consumer welfare maximization."' s In the early 1980s,
45 See id. at 564-72 (1955).
46 WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE Evo-
LUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTiTRUST AcT (1965).
47 Id. at 89, 94, 96-97.
48 Id. at 94.
49 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTTRUsT PARADOX (1978).
50 Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman
Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
51 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 49, at 56-66.
Factionalfoundations : 253
Robert Lande challenged Bork's interpretation and contended that
Congress as a whole had multiple economic, social, and political
goals in mind when it passed the Sherman Act. Lande found,
however, that Congress was concerned much more strongly with
some of these goals than with others. In particular, Lande con-
cluded, Congress primarily sought to attack unfair wealth trans-
fers from consumers to sellers resulting from supracompetitive
pricing. In cases of conflict, Lande found, Congress intended to
subordinate all other goals to this primary aim.
5 2
In a major 1988 study,5 3 David Millon surveyed at length 19th-
century republican and liberal concerns for the threats to individ-
ual liberty posed by concentrated economic and political power.
He argued that such concerns provided the motivation and intel-
lectual context for congressional passage of the Sherman Act in
1890. Millon did not, however, suggest that one group of con-
gressmen adopted a "republican" perspective while others were
inspired instead by liberal ideas. Rather, Millon concluded that
Congress as a whole was influenced by a traditional mixture of
republican and liberal ideas and sought to prevent the harms to
democratic processes, to consumers, and to competitors that
republican and liberal thinking highlighted as the product of arti-
ficially acquired, excessive economic power.
Numerous other works, of course, also have addressed the leg-
islative history of the Sherman Act. Some of these also have
explored at length the larger contemporary context of political and
economic thinking out of which the Sherman Act arose.54 A num-
ber of articles have found a congressional desire to further simul-
taneously a variety of economic, social, and political goals, but
have pictured the origins of that desire in a somewhat different
52 See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Pri-
mary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 67 (1982).
53 David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1219 (1988).
54 See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and
Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, at
50 OHIo ST. L.J. 257, 258-300 (1989).
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way than have the various authors already noted.5 5 Other writers
have offered still other distinctive interpretations of congressional
intent.5 6 None of the various prior accounts of the congressional
deliberations, however, have described them as Peritz does, as an
extended battle between two sharply divided ideological and
rhetorical factions, much less a two-sided ideological conflict in
which Sherman's basic antitrust policy goals were rejected
through congressional passage of the statute bearing his name.
Why does Peritz reach such a dramatically different conclusion
regarding this much reviewed legislative record? Ultimately, how
compelling is his argument?
Peritz's view appears to rest on at least three important but
analytically separate claims. The first claim is that despite the
nearly unanimous congressional vote in favor of the final bill, not
all contemporary congressmen shared the sweeping position
Peritz attributes to Sherman that all price-fixing combinations
should be banned, even if established defensively to combat
ruinous competition or distortions caused by "trust" activity. The
second claim is that those congressmen wanting to leave room for
"reasonable" restraints of this type were not merely an isolated
handful of members with atypical views. Instead, it is claimed,
these members constituted a powerful faction that ultimately was
able to prevail over Sherman's faction on the critical roll call vote
that referred Sherman's bill to the Judiciary Committee. The third
claim is that the congressmen in each of these two powerful
55 See, e.g., 1 EARL KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 4.18 (1980);
John Flynn, The Reagan Administration's Antitrust Policy, "Original
Intent" and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTTRUST
BULL. 259 (1988); Eleanor Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in
Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554,
563-67, 584-85 (1986); Eleanor Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-
Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are
We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987); May, supra note 54.
56 See, e.g., Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jetti-
soning the Constitutional Sherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV. 263 (1986);
Clark, Antitrust Comes Full Circle: The Return to the Cartelization Stan-
dard, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (1985).
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camps were not simply an eclectic collection of members prag-
matically coalescing in order to support or oppose Sherman's
original bill on a diversity of grounds. Instead, Peritz asserts,
these two factions were ideologically cohesive groups whose
members joined forces on the basis of their common embrace of
one of two distinctly different configurations of basic philosophi-
cal commitments.
The congressional record supports the first of these claims
much more strongly than it supports either the second or third
assertion. Peritz clearly is right in pointing out that both within
and outside of Congress in 1890, not everyone concerned about
contemporary cartelization and trusts supported an across-the-
board ban on price fixing that would bar the establishment of
defensive, countervailing cartels designed merely to insure a
"fair" return. Peritz's next two claims, however, are considerably
less compelling.
Peritz relies on three aspects of the congressional record to
support his depiction of the congressional deliberations as an
extended struggle between two ideological factions that Sher-
man's camp failed to win. First, he highlights the comments of
particular speakers in the debates to illustrate the two factions'
respective rhetorics and commitments. Second, as previously
mentioned, Peritz cites the 31-28 roll call vote referring Sher-
man's bill to the Senate Judiciary Committee as an important
product of the factional struggle he believes dominated the
debates. Third, he stresses the differences between the language
of Sherman's bill and the language of the bill the Committee actu-
ally reported out and that Congress passed.
Peritz cites comments by Senators Sherman (R. Ohio),57 Teller
(R. Colo.),5 8 George (D. Miss.),5 9 and Jones (D. Nev.),60 and by
57 PERrrz, supra note 1, at 14 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890)).
58 Id. at 15 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 2561 (1890) and 20 CONG. REc.
1457 (1889)).
59 Id. at 309 n.18 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 1768 (1890)).
60 Id. at 15.
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Representative William Mason (R. Ill.)61 to illustrate the thought
of the "Sherman faction." He cites remarks by Senators Platt (D.
Conn.), 62 Edmunds (R. Vt.),63 and Hoar (R. Mass.), 64 and Repre-
sentatives Stewart (D. Ga.) 65 and Morse (D. Mass.) 66 to exemplify
the ideological stance of the opposing faction. As other writers
previously have noted,67 the comments of Senator Platt and of
Representatives Stewart and Morse do demonstrate that at least
some members of Congress wanted to allow "reasonable" defen-
sive cartels in American economic life generally. Indeed, other
authors have identified at least one additional member of
Congress not noted by Peritz who expressed such a view, Senator
Stewart (R. Nev.).68 Prior studies of the legislative history, how-
ever, have stressed the rarity of such expressions in the congres-
sional deliberations.6 9 Peritz, in contrast, elevates such views to an
importance within the debates at least comparable to the opposite
policy position held by Sherman and others like him. Peritz does
not cite comments by any additional members of Congress that
directly echoed the broad support for defensive cartels voiced by
Senator Platt and Representatives Stewart and Morse.70 Instead, as
61 Id. at 15 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 2561 (1890)).
62 Id. at 16 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 2729 (1890)); see also id. at 18
(citing 21 CONG. REc. 2720-21 (1890)).
63 Id. at 20 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 3148, 3152 (1890)); see also id. at
23 (citing 21 CoNG. RFc. 3151-52 (1890)).
64 Id. at 20 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 3145, 3146, 3152 (1890)).
65 Id. at 16 (citing 21 CONG. REc. 5956 (1890)).
66 Id. at 309 n.21 (citing CONG. REc. 5954 (1890)).
67 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 50, at 22-23, 42; THORELLI, supra note
26, at 190, 226.
68 See, e.g., THORELLI, supra note 26, at 190. As already noted, Peritz
does mention his namesake in the other House, Representative Stewart.
69 See, e.g., THORELLI, supra note 26, at 191, 226-27; Bork, supra
note 50, at 23, 42.
70 Peritz associates Senators Edmunds and Hoar with the faction
opposing Sherman on the basis of their comments in support of the Judi-
ciary Committee bill that Peritz sees as a rejection of Sherman's philo-
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already noted, Peritz relies on the referral of Sherman's bill to
committee and the subsequent congressional adoption of a new
bill with completely different wording.
Reliance on the roll call vote that referred Sherman's bill to
the Judiciary Committee, as evidence of a strong factional divi-
sion within the debates, raises significant problems. A prominent
problem is the misalignment in the recorded votes for and against
referral. If the roll call vote was a climactic moment in a sharply
pitched struggle between an ideologically united Sherman faction
and an opposing faction embracing a fundamentally different set
of philosophical commitments, one would not expect to find the
voting pattern that actually prevailed on the roll call vote. Of the
three Senators Peritz identifies as members of the rhetorical camp
opposing Sherman, only one, Senator Platt, actually voted to refer
Sherman's bill to the Judiciary Committee. Both Senator
Edmunds, the chair of the Judiciary Committee, and Senator
Hoar, another member of the Committee, voted against referring
Sherman's bill to their Committee. Of the four Senators Peritz
locates within the "Sherman faction," only one, Sherman himself,
actually voted to oppose referral of his bill. Two other Senators
Peritz identifies with the Sherman camp, Teller and George, voted
in favor of referral, while the fourth identified member, Senator
Jones, is recorded as having been absent.
7 '
sophical outlook and approach. The comments he quotes did not address
the question of defensive cartels. Instead, Peritz notes Hoar's comment
that the Committee bill was already well understood because it affirmed
traditional common law. He quotes Edmunds' similar comment about the
bill's adoption of well-known common law language and his comment
that the bill would not condemn an individual who got the whole business
in a certain trade merely by superior skill and intelligence. See PErrZ,
supra note 1, at 20.
71 See 21 CONG. REc. 2731 (1890). Peritz does not note the votes of
any individual Senators on this roll call vote or offer any possible expla-
nation for the apparent misalignment in the voting pattern. Other
accounts of the legislative history have attributed the referral of Sher-
man's by-then heavily amended bill to growing concerns about both its
complexity and its constitutional foundations. See, e.g., LETWIN, supra
note 46, at 93; THORELLI, supra note 26, at 199.
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The third aspect of the congressional record that Peritz relies
on to support his new rhetorical history of the birth of federal
antitrust law is the Judiciary Committee's wholesale replacement
of the language contained in Sherman's original bill and congres-
sional enactment of the Committee's version. Leading commenta-
tors since the mid-1950s have contended that adoption of the
Committee's bill in place of Sherman's did not implement any
substantial change in policy, except with regard to remedies. 72
Peritz strongly seeks to challenge this orthodox view. In doing so,
Peritz relies in part on his prior arguments that the debates were
an extended struggle between philosophical factions, inferring
that if this was so it is reasonable to interpret the complete dis-
placement of Sherman's preferred language as a rebuff to the
philosophical premises underlying that language. He also stresses
Senator Sherman's expressed unhappiness with the referral and
displacement of his own bill.73 In addition, Peritz offers an expla-
nation to harmonize his conclusion of sharp factional warfare and
last-minute substantive policy change with the fact that Congress
passed the Committee's version with only a single dissenting vote
and after only a few hours of not very pointed additional debate.
As already noted, Peritz suggests that such near unanimity
became possible despite fundamental factionalization within
Congress because the final bill's combination of common law lia-
bility standards and "un-common law" remedies constituted a
synthesis or attempt to occupy a middle ground and thus may
have offered something to both factions.
Members of the 51st Congress might or might not have
thought that the Committee's displacement of Sherman's wording
effected a major change in liability standards. Congressmen sym-
pathetic to a reasonable cartel argument might have thought that
such an argument would stand a better chance under the general
language of section 1 of the Sherman Act as passed than it would
72 See, e.g., LETwIN, supra note 46, at 94; THORELLI, supra note 26, at
228; Bork, supra note 50, at 46-47.
73 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 14 (citing Mr. Sherman Gives Up Hope,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1890, at 4 (quoting comments appearing in the ST.
Louis GLOBE-DEMOCRAT)).
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have under Sherman's bill. On the other hand, there would not
seem to be anything in the mere language of section 1 as adopted
to preclude a belief that no significant change in liability stan-
dards actually had been accomplished. Prior studies of the legisla-
tive history have argued that the members of the 51st Congress
probably embraced this latter belief, citing the rapidity with which
the substitute bill was adopted and the fact that throughout the
debates Sherman strongly had insisted that his bill did no more
than to adopt the common law standards that the Committee's bill
embraced explicitly through its language of "contracts, combina-
tions. . . .and conspiracies in restraint of trade." 74
If the general wording of the Sherman Act by itself does not
clearly indicate the extent of substantive policy change it imple-
mented, what of the larger legislative record beyond just the per-
sons and developments Peritz cites? How strongly does this
record support the assertion that Sherman's philosophical outlook
lost out in a rhetorical conflict between two relatively cohesive
ideological factions, the first committed to full and free competi-
tion, rough competitive equality, and across-the-board hostility to
cartels, and the second dedicated to competition limited by vigor-
ous protection of private property rights and liberty of contract
and generally supporting reasonable, defensive cartels designed
merely to insure a "fair" return?
Appeal to the larger record does not appear to remedy the
evidentiary problems already noted. Instead, it seems to undercut
this picture of sharp, stable philosophical bifurcation within
Congress. Consider, for example, the positions taken by the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee members. 75 Within 6 days after the refer-
ral of Sherman's bill, these members unanimously agreed
76 to
74 See, e.g., LErwiN, supra note 46, at 95-96; THORELLI, supra note
26, at 183, 228; Bork, supra note 50, at 45-47.
75 At the time that Sherman's bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, the Committee consisted of Republicafi Senators Edmunds (R.
Vt.), Hoar (R. Mass.), Ingalls (R. Kan.), Evarts (R. N.Y.), and Wilson (R.
Iowa) and Democratic Senators Coke (D. Tex.), Vest (D. Mo.), George
(D. Miss.), and Pugh (D. Ala.). THORELLI, supra note 26, at 199.
76 THORELLI, supra note 26, at 199.
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replace Sherman's bill with new liability standards that apparently
were written by the Committee chair, Senator Edmunds. 77 At least
four of these members, however, previously had expressed support
for the general liability standards and policy aims of Sherman's
original bill.78 Should we infer that they voted to scrap Sherman's
original bill because they suddenly changed their general factional
allegiance? Or, alternatively, should we conclude that they
embraced Edmunds' new draft because they saw no substantial
difference in the liability standards it proposed while finding
Edmunds' draft superior in other respects? 79
The larger legislative record does offer additional evidence of
sympathy for "reasonable" restraints. Indeed, many members of
Congress beyond those mentioned by Peritz expressed some sup-
port for defensive price-fixing combinations designed to insure a
"fair" return. The views of these additional members, however, do
not fit neatly within the picture of ideologically opposed factions
set out in Competition Policy in America 1888-1992. Instead,
they tend to undermine the view that Congress was split into two
sharply opposed camps divided on the general philosophical lines
Peritz suggests.
Many more congressmen expressed support for certain specific
types of defensive cartels than proclaimed sympathy for defensive
cartels in general. In the congressional debates, selective support
for defensive price fixing typically was justified not through
explicit invocations of general property rights principles or liberty
of contract ideology, but instead through expressions of sympathy
for the plight of farmers and laborers in particular. Senators
77 See, e.g., LmrwIN, supra note 46, at 94; THORELLI, supra note 26, at
212.
78 These four were the Democratic members, Senators George,
Coke, Vest, and Pugh. For a summary of the views expressed during the
debates by these members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, see Bork,
supra note 50, at 17-18.
79 It might have been thought, for example, that Edmunds' draft
addressed more satisfactorily the constitutional basis for the legislation or
desirably eliminated the complexity that characterized the amended ver-
sion of Sherman's bill that had been referred to the Committee.
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hoping to shelter defensive price-fixing combinations among
farmers or laborers overwhelmingly sought to achieve such pro-
tection by expressing support for a specific exemption for these
groups rather than by mobilizing as a separate ideological faction
to promote a general liability standard contrasting with the one in
Sherman's bill.80 Thus, when Senator George, the chief proponent
of such a farmer-labor exemption, offered his own bill as an alter-
native to Sherman's proposal, he simply added this exemption
while retaining the same general liability tests set out in Sher-
man's bill. 81
Senator George was not the only Senator who supported the
"full and free competition" language that Sherman proposed while
simultaneously desiring special protection for at least farmers and
laborers, if not for defensive cartels in general. Sherman himself
declared that even without an express exception, his bill would
not in fact cover combinations by farmers or by laborers to
increase their prices or wages. 82 He proclaimed that he was happy,
however, to amend his own bill to provide an explicit exception
for such combinations and offered an amendment adopting Sena-
tor George's exemption language.8 3 The Senate as a whole voted
80 On the congressional debates, amendments, and votes on a farmer-
labor exemption, see, e.g., Bork, supra note 50, at 10, 12, 31; THORELLI,
supra note 26, at 193, 197, 231-32.
81 On March 26, 1890, Senator Gray adopted Senator George's sug-
gested provision as his own and offered it as an amendment. Like Sher-
man's bill, George's provision banned contracts, arrangements, and
combinations "made with a view of preventing or which tend to prevent
. . . full and free competition . . . or which shall have the effect of
advancing the cost of any such article to the consumer." See 21 CONG.
REc. 2657.
82 See 21 CONG. REc. 2562, 2611.
83 See 21 CONG. REc. 2611-12. The amendment proposed to add the
following language to § 1 of Sherman's bill:
Provided, That this act shall not be construed to apply to any
arrangements, agreements, or combinations between laborers,
made with the view of lessening the number of hours of their
labor or of increasing their wages; nor to any arrangements,
agreements, associations, or combinations among persons
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to add this amendment to Sherman's bill prior to the time it was
referred to the Judiciary Committee.84
The leading congressional opponent of such protection for
farmer or labor price-fixing combinations was Senator Edmunds,
the chair of the Judiciary Committee.85 Indeed, Edmunds may
have been responsible for the absence of any farmer or labor
exemption in the Committee's bill.86 It is generally thought, how-
ever, that Edmunds drafted section 1 of the Sherman Act.87 He
thus was a key architect of the document that Peritz pictures as a
retreat from the full and free competition position advocated by
the Sherman faction. Accordingly, it seems difficult to contain
Edmunds' thinking comfortably within either a "full and free
competition" faction supporting Sherman's original bill without
allowance for defensive cartels or a rival faction opposing Sher-
man's bill in order to leave room for private, defensive restrictions
on competition.
In short, Peritz aptly points out that consideration of antitrust
legislation implicated basic issues not only of competition, but
also of liberty, equality, private property rights, and the legitimate
scope of government activity. In addition, he convincingly
stresses the presence of some striking initial differences of
approach and emphasis among the members of Congress as they
debated this legislative initiative. What he has not clearly demon-
strated, however, is that these differences reflected fundamental
philosophical disagreements that impelled the members to coa-
lesce into the two particular factional groupings Peritz suggests,
like iron filings drawn to two opposite but comparably powerful
poles of a single giant magnet.
engaged in horticulture or agriculture, made with a view of
enhancing the price of their own agricultural or horticultural
products.
21 CONG. REC. 2612.
84 See 21 CONG. REc. 2612.
85 See, e.g., THORELLI, supra note 26, at 197, 231-32.
86 See, e.g., id. at 232; Bork, supra note 50, at 12, 31.
87 See, e.g., THORELLI, supra note 26, at 212; LETwjN, supra note 46,
at 94.
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II. The Sherman Act in the courts through the rise of
the classical rule of reason
A. Factional fighting in the formative era of American
antitrust jurisprudence
After discussing the congressional antitrust deliberations
between 1888 and 1890, Peritz next addresses the battles over
Sherman Act interpretation that were waged in the Supreme Court
during the two decades following the Act's passage. He argues
that these battles largely, if not completely, picked up where the
factional fighting in Congress left off. After 1890, he notes, "Lit-
eralist" and "Rule of Reasonist" camps on the High Court took
the rhetorical places of the Sherman faction and its opposition.
The "Literalists," says Peritz, strongly held to the small dealer,
individualist vision of competitive rivalry embraced by the Sher-
man camp. The "Rule of Reasonists," however, stressed the invio-
lability of private property rights, especially liberty of contract,
sometimes urging this position more emphatically than had the
congressmen who earlier supported reasonable restraints to secure
a "fair return."88
Peritz pictures the Court's antitrust cases between 1890 and
1911 as falling into two overlapping cycles. Each of these cycles,
he says, began with deep intercamp conflicts sparked by "fac-
tional commitments to competition policy and common-law prop-
erty rights."89 Peritz finds, however, that in each of these two
cycles the two factions were able to reach "surprisingly swift res-
olutions" of their differences. 9° The cases in the first cycle of con-
flict and resolution involved the treatment of associations,
specifically, commercial cartels and labor unions. The cases in the
second cycle focused instead on the proper treatment of large cor-
porate size and the legality of trusts, which typically had been
established through a combination of mergers and questionable
forms of competitive rivalry.
88 See PERnrZ, supra note 1, at 27.
89 Id. at 28.
90 See id.
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1. THE FIRST CYCLE Peritz notes that in his 1897 opinion for the
Court in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,91
Justice Peckham rejected the holding and reasoning of lower court
judges who, like most lower federal court judges in cases up to
that time, had interpreted the Sherman Act to incorporate common
law restraint of trade doctrines. The lower court judges, says
Peritz, believed that such common law doctrines required a deter-
mination of the "reasonableness" of challenged restraints of trade.
They accepted the defendant railroads' arguments that their cartel
was lawful because it only established reasonable prices in an
effort to avert ruinous competition. In so holding, Peritz contends,
the lower court judges in Trans-Missouri strongly echoed the sup-
port for defensive restraints earlier voiced by Sherman's factional
opponents in the 51st Congress.
92
On appeal, Peritz notes, Justice Peckham rejected such views
and instead embraced the outlook of Sherman's congressional
camp. Writing for a five-Justice Literalist majority, Peckham
declared that the Sherman Act went beyond the common law to
condemn all contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint
of trade and not merely those that might have been found unrea-
sonable at common law. He announced that "competition, free and
unrestricted is the general rule" 93 and that only prices fixed by
competition could be deemed reasonable. 94 Justice White, writing
for the four Justices in the Rule of Reasonist minority, allied him-
self, conversely, with the views of the defendants, the lower court
judges, and Sherman's rhetorical foes in the congressional
debates. 95 In short, Peritz asserts that the Trans-Missouri opinions
announced the Court's division into two opposing factions com-
91 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
92 See PERITZ, supra note 1, at 29-30.
93 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 333
(1897).
94 See PErrz, supra note 1, at 30.
95 See id.
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mitted, respectively, "to either 'free competition' or 'freedom of
contract' " 96
Peckham's Literalist opinion, Peritz relates, primarily
expressed fear that, if not checked, private restraints of competi-
tion would drive out of business "small dealers and worthy men,"
whose demise would be a great social loss even if a particular
restrictive combination effected a reduction in the price of the
commodities its members sold.97 The Literalists believed that car-
tels were harmful not only because they raised prices above com-
petitive levels, but also because they threatened the
"republicanist" ideal of rough equality in economic life.98 The Lit-
eralists feared, for example, that the collapse of a competitive
market system built on rivalry among such independent, roughly
equal firms and entrepreneurs seriously would undermine virtuous
republican government. Peritz explains that this view partly was
based on a belief that "an independent entrepreneur could be an
independent citizen, while a 'servant or agent of a corporation'
could not."99 The Literalists, he says, also feared that the rise of
giant new private centers of wealth increased the danger that
republican government might be imperiled through direct political
corruption.
00
Peritz concludes that the dissenting Rule of Reasonist faction
was haunted chiefly by a distinctly different general fear, the
Hobbesian specter of a potential descent into anarchic industrial
warfare. He relates that Justice White, for this faction, rhetorically
called for the "utmost liberty of contracting" as the essential anti-
dote for such a social and political danger.' 0 ' In particular, White
96 See id. at 31.
97 Peritz finds this "republicanist concern for a disappearing class of
independent entrepreneurs" to be the dominant theme in Peckham's opin-
ion for the Literalist majority in Trans-Missouri. Id. at 35.
98 See id. at 32.
99 Id. at31.
100 See id.
10 Id. at 32.
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urged that both businessmen and laborers should be left free to
form private combinations designed to insure a fair return in the
face of otherwise excessively intense economic competition.102
Peritz finds that the following year, in the Court's second rail-
road cartel case, the "incompatible visions of commercial
society"'103 held respectively by the Court's two rhetorical factions
produced the same split among the Justices. 04 In United States v.
Joint Traffic Association,10 5 the Literalists continued to maintain
that congressional competition policy overrode the common law.
The Rule of Reasonists, who dissented but did not produce any
new written opinion of their own, continued to look sympatheti-
cally, says Peritz, on defensive combinations established to guar-
antee fair remuneration.
0 6
Peritz notes, however, that in the midst of this continuing fac-
tional division, important rhetorical changes appeared. Peckham,
for the Literalist majority, no longer stressed the importance of the
economic welfare of "small dealers and worthy men." Instead, he
emphasized lower rates as the main benefit of untrammeled com-
petition. Simultaneously, Peckham adopted a new stance toward
the common law. In Joint Traffic, Peritz relates, Peckham
departed from his earlier approach in Trans-Missouri and now
invoked a traditional aspect of common law restraint of trade
doctrine itself to condemn the railroad cartel at issue in the
case. 0 7 Noting the long-established common law distinction
between direct and ancillary restraints, Peckham declared that
the defendants' combination was unsupportable because its direct
and immediate effect was "to prevent any competition what-
102 Id.
103 See id. at 35.
104 Joint Traffic was a five-to-three decision. Justice McKenna did
not participate in decision of the case. See United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 578 (1898).
105 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
106 See PERITZ, supra note 1, at 35-36.
107 See id. at 35.
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ever."' 10 8 Peckham's opinion in Joint Traffic, says Peritz, later
proved to be the initial step toward establishment of the factional
accommodation that brought to a close the first of the two cycles
of early Supreme Court Sherman Act jurisprudence. 109
Peritz points out that the Court reached unanimous decisions
in almost all the cartel cases it addressed during the two decades
following its decision in Joint Traffic. 11o He traces this new una-
nimity to Justice Peckham's 1899 opinion for a unanimous Court
in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,"' which con-
demned a bid rigging agreement among major producers of iron
pipe. Peritz suggests three reasons why both of the Court's philo-
sophical factions joined in Peckham's opinion and why no other
Justice felt a need to offer a written opinion of his own.112 First,
Peritz argues, both factions deemed the secret arrangement to be
illegitimate because it defrauded the public. Second, while Justice
Peckham continued to declare that the level of prices collectively
set by the defendants was doctrinally irrelevant, Peckham went on
to note that in any case the prices set by these defendants in fact
were unreasonable. 13 Finally, Peritz relates, Peckham buttressed
his condemnation of the cartel by invoking reasoning reminiscent
of the logic the Court had used 4 years earlier to uphold a labor
injunction in In re Debs."4 In this connection, says Peritz, Peck-
ham appealed to the "liberal sensibilities" of the Rule of Reason-
ist faction by arguing that the federal government legitimately
108 United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 565 (1898).
This stress on direct and immediate effects echoed Peckham's earlier
comment in Trans-Missouri declaring the cartel at issue in that case
harmful because its "direct, immediate, and necessary effect [was] to put
a restraint upon trade or commerce." 166 U.S. at 342.
109 See PERrIZ, supra note 1, at 35-36.
110 See id. at 37.
"1 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
112 See PERrrz, supra note 1, at 36.
113 175 U.S. 211, 235-38 (1899).
114 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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could block not only state interference with interstate commerce,
but also similar interference with interstate commerce arising
from private associational activity like the cartel challenged in
Addyston Pipe.15 Both factions could endorse the federal govern-
ment's use of the Sherman Act as the vehicle to eliminate such
interference with interstate commerce, Peritz notes, because the
challenged cartel simultaneously ran afoul of each faction's own
preferred interpretation of the Act. Because the cartel "was fraud-
ulent and called for unreasonable prices, it met both the Literalist
(direct) and Rule of Reasonists (unreasonable) tests, both com-
mon law standards, for illegality.""16
Peritz concludes, however, that the factional accommodation
reached by the turn of the century and reflected in the Supreme
Court's unanimity in almost all cartel cases after Joint Traffic
came at a substantial ideological cost. Specifically, the earlier
republicanist underpinnings of the Literalist position, its earlier
concerns for the economic viability of "small dealers and worthy
men," were abandoned. Peritz finds that the two Court factions
converged by mutually embracing, instead, "a libertarian rhetoric
for antitrust, situated comfortably within Lochner's constitutional
framework, founded in liberty of contract."'1 7 Peritz relates, how-
ever, that this "rhetorical shift seemed to have no practical conse-
quences for cartel cases: Both antitrust visions, both free
competition and freedom of contract rhetorics, portrayed cartels
as always direct, always unreasonable, and thus always illegal
restraints of trade."" 8
By the close of the first cycle of Sherman Act adjudication,
Peritz declares, Literalists and Rule of Reasonists alike not only
embraced such blanket condemnation of price fixing, but also
applied it to labor combinations seeking higher wages as well as
to business cartels seeking higher prices.1 9 The Court's hostility
115 See PERITZ, supra note 1, at 36-37.
116 Id. at 37.
117 See id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 37-38.
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to both business cartels and labor union strikes rested, says Peritz,
on a fundamental conception of competition "as rivalry between
individuals."'120 This apparent evenhandedness in the Court's treat-
ment of business and labor, however, was belied, he stresses, by a
deeper discrepancy in the Court's perception of individualism in
business and labor contexts more generally. The Court treated
business cartels, like striking unions, as collections of individuals.
The High Court treated very differently an association of persons
who joined together as a corporation. The Court, notes Peritz,
deemed such an association to constitute collectively only a single
individual in law, and therefore found it not to be a combination at
all for antitrust purposes.1
2'
2. THE SECOND CYCLE Peritz believes that despite the early
establishment of High Court unanimity in cartel cases and contin-
uing changes in Court membership, the Supreme Court continued
to be divided into a "free competition" Literalist faction and a
"freedom of contract" Rule of Reasonist faction up through 1911,
not only in antitrust cases but in its jurisprudence more generally.
The specific legal issues over which the two factions fought, how-
ever, changed as time went on. The second cycle of Sherman Act
cases, says Peritz, posed more sharply than had previous cases the
issue of when business aggregations should be treated as collec-
tions of persons or, alternatively, as merely a single individual in
law. Peritz finds that the first great factional battle over this issue
was fought in Northern Securities Co. v. United States. 22 Peritz
devotes considerable attention to this case, partly because he finds
that it led unexpectedly to new fragmentation within the Literalist
camp itself.
23
a. Northern Securities: vigilance against anticompetitive com-
binations versus protection of essential rights of property and
association In his plurality opinion for himself and Justices
Brown, Day, and McKenna in Northern Securities, Justice Harlan
120 Id. at 37.
121 Id. at 38.
122 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
123 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 38-39.
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strongly reiterated the primacy of competition as the rule of
trade. 24 He expressly reaffirmed the Literalists' previously estab-
lished ban on every contract, combination or conspiracy directly
restraining interstate trade. In so doing, Harlan specifically noted
that some people believed the recent rise of enormous private
wealth made the rule of competition more necessary than it ever
had been before. While Peritz suggests that this comment might
be taken as the "last residue" of the Literalists' earlier republican
commitment to "small dealers and worthy men,"'125 he acknowl-
edges that Harlan never referred explicitly to Trans-Missouri's
"republicanist" rhetoric. 126 Instead, Harlan supported his condem-
nation of the Northern Securities merger on the authority of prior
Supreme Court precedent banning "all direct restraints" and on
the basis of the Court's duty to apply faithfully the rule of compe-
tition that Harlan believed Congress itself had embodied in the
Sherman Act. Harlan noted that the Court previously had held
unanimously in Addyston Pipe that Congress constitutionally
could decree such a rule without violating the constitutional guar-
antee of liberty of contract. Avoiding the troublesome issue that
Northern Securities raised as to whether Congress could restrict
the fundamental right to sell one's own property, including corpo-
rate stock, Harlan merely labeled the challenged merger another
example of an anticompetitive combination and condemned it on
the authority of Addyston Pipe.'27
Justice Brewer, an original member of the Literalist faction,
concurred in the result. Peritz emphasizes, however, that Brewer's
concurring opinion announced that Brewer now believed that the
Sherman Act should be read to ban only unreasonable restraints of
124 The case was decided at a time when Justices Holmes and Day
recently had joined the Court, replacing two of the original members of
the Rule of Reasonist faction, Justices Gray and Shiras. See THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 985 (Kermit L.
Hall et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter THE OXFORD COMPANION].
125 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 40.
126 See id. at 41.
127 See id. at 40-41.
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trade and that the government should not interfere with the basic
individual right to buy and sell property.
28
Justices White and Holmes each wrote a separate dissenting
opinion.1 29 Peritz stresses that each of these two opinions under-
scored the importance of the basic property right of purchase and
sale. Stressing that property ownership was the basis of civilized
society, Justice White declared that Congress did not have power
under the Interstate Commerce Clause to regulate ownership or
sale of railroad stock. 130 White believed, says Peritz, that govern-
ment prohibition of the sale of stock, even to block a massive
merger of competing interstate railroad lines, would amount to an
unconstitutional taking banned by the Fifth Amendment.
31 Justice
Holmes similarly stressed the fundamentality of property owner-
ship rights. Simultaneously, Holmes expressed agreement with
concerns that the congressional "freedom of contract/reasonable
combination" faction previously had expressed during the Sher-
man Act debates with regard to the disintegration of society into
atomistic warfare.
32
Justice Peckham did not write a separate opinion in Northern
Securities, but joined in the dissenting opinions of both Justice
White and Justice Holmes. Peritz explains Peckham's "desertion
to the Rule of Reasonist faction" on the basis of Peckham's con-
tinuing, but now differently focused, commitment to liberty. In the
price-fixing cases, says Peritz, Peckham had embraced the "com-
petition rhetoric of industrial liberty" in order to stress the impor-
tance of protecting the freedom freely to exercise individual
judgment in the conduct of a business, particularly the setting
128 See id. at 43.
129 See 193 U.S. 197, 364-400 (White, J., dissenting); 400-11
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Justices White and Holmes concurred in each
other's dissenting opinions. Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Peckham
each concurred in both of these two dissenting opinions.
130 PERrrZ, supra note 1, at 42.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 42-43.
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of product prices, without regard to any constraining agreement
with other rivals. In the 1904 Northern Securities case, however,
in order to defend individual freedom to sell one's own business,
Peckham instead embraced the "property rhetoric of liberty of
contract" associated with the faction he previously had
opposed. 3
3
Peritz suggests that the antitrust cases through 1904 demon-
strate how differing commitments to liberty can be related to one
another in more than just one way. Sometimes such differing com-
mitments conflict. For example, he argues, the cartel cases dis-
played a clash between a republicanist commitment to rough
competitive equality and a liberal commitment to vigilance
against legislative redistribution of property rights. Peritz notes,
however, that differing commitments to liberty do not always
have to lead to disagreement over specific results, but instead can
sometimes coalesce in support of the same outcome. Peritz argues
that this happened in the Northern Securities dissents, in which
liberty of contract, property rights, and republican concerns for
freedom of association all were invoked to oppose the govern-
ment's attack on the railroad merger in the case. 1
Even though various commitments to liberty coalesced to
oppose condemnation of the Northern Securities merger, says
Peritz, a wide impasse still remained between, on the one hand,
the commitment to individual liberty expressed by Justice Harlan
for himself and three other Justices and, on the other hand, the
commitment to individual liberty expressed by the dissenting
members of the Court. Harlan's opinion vigorously affirmed the
competition rhetoric associated with pointed fears about private
economic power and the future of democratic government. The
opinions by White and Holmes instead built heavily on a belief in
liberty of contract while expressing heightened fears that Harlan's
Literalism would severely threaten basic "individual rights of pri-
vate property and private association." 135
133 Id. at 43-44.
134 Id. at 44.
135 See id. at 44-45.
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b. Lochner v. New York as confirmation of the general fac-
tional framework Following this analysis of the 1904 Northern
Securities case, Peritz next highlights the famous case of Lochner
v. New York, 136 decided a year later. He does so to illustrate the
pervasiveness on the Court of the factional alignments and
dynamics he emphasizes in connection with contemporary
antitrust cases. Peritz stresses that Lochner posed basic "questions
about liberty of contract, economic inequality, and the legitimate
scope of government regulation" that were similar to those
addressed in Northern Securities.137 He notes that when Peckham,
writing for the Lochner majority, struck down a maximum hours
law for bakers, he strongly echoed the concerns about government
power that had been expressed in the dissenting opinions in
Northern Securities. Such concerns, says Peritz, led Peckham to
emphasize the need to draw a sharp line between legitimate exer-
cises of state police power and infringements on freedom of con-
tract, for fear that otherwise the door would be opened to an ever
expanding range of discriminatory government regulation in favor
of workers. 38
Justice Harlan dissented in Lochner.139 As he had in Northern
Securities, Peritz notes, Harlan displayed greater concern for
inequality of economic power than for excessive government reg-
ulation. Harlan rejected Peckham's insistence on the formal bar-
gaining equality of the employer and employees. Simultaneously,
he deemed legitimate the legislature's finding of actual inequality
of bargaining power and the legislature's reliance on numerous
studies demonstrating the unhealthiness of prolonged work in
bakeries. He therefore found the maximum hours law to be well
within the limits of state police power and not an infringement on
liberty of contract.1
40
136 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
137 See PEarrz, supra note 1, at 45.
138 Id. at 45-46.
139 198 U.S. 45, 65-74 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
140 See PERrrz, supra note 1, at 47.
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In Peritz's view, Northern Securities and Lochner together
most clearly revealed "the jurisprudential conflicts . . .in the
decade following the turn of the century."'141 In each of the two
cases, he notes, Harlan's faction found legislative distribution of
economic power to be legitimate, while the opposing faction
found the same government action to be an improper impairment
of freedom of contract. The two factions drew the boundary limit
of government regulation in different places because of their
strongly contrasting commitments to equality: "While the Harlan
faction paid attention to the economic circumstances in each case,
both Peckham and White proceeded on an assumption of formal
equality."'142
Holmes' dissent in Lochner famously declared that "[g]eneral
propositions do not decide concrete cases"'143 and adopted a stance
of great, but not unlimited, judicial deference to majoritarian leg-
islative judgments. Peritz argues, however, that Holmes, too, was
animated by adherence to a fundamental general principle. In
Peritz's view, Holmes' dissent in Northern Securities indicated
not only the political economic principle that Holmes deemed
fundamental, but also Holmes' willingness to countermand
majoritarian legislative action that might gravely undermine it.
Peritz declares that while Holmes, like his colleagues, was moti-
vated by commitment to a particular variant of liberty, his most
fundamental concern was not freedom of contract. Instead,
Holmes cared most about preserving freedom to associate, for
both businesses and laborers, in a world otherwise threatened with
descent into anarchic, atomistic individualism. 44
c. The 1911 rule of reason cases: automatically condemned
cartels versus personified trusts The Court's substantive due pro-
cess and antitrust jurisprudence over the next 10 years, Peritz
says, largely reflected accommodation between the Court's two
141 Id. at 48.
142 Id.
143 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
'44 PErTZ, supra note 1, at 47-48.
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philosophical camps. 45 Within this setting of general factional
accommodation, he relates, the Court in the 1911 cases of Stan-
dard Oil Co. v. United States146 and United States v. American
Tobacco Co. 147 revisited the issue of the legality of trusts that had
so sharply divided the Court in the 1904 Northern Securities case.
Now, however, the Justices were able to achieve a nearly unani-
mous consensus resolution of the problem.
48
In Peritz's view, the key to this consensus resolution was the
Court's creative personification of the Standard Oil Trust, or, in
the companion case, the American Tobacco Trust, as merely a sin-
gle individual, an extension of the leading figure behind the estab-
lishment of the trust in question:
By imagining the trust problem as a question of individual conduct
rather than an instance of combination, the Court could reconcile com-
petition policy as articulated in the cartel cases with common-law pri-
vate property rights and with the constitutionalized liberty of contract
propounded in Justice White's Northern Securities dissent.
49
In his discussion of the 1911 cases, Peritz reiterates his view
that both Sherman's congressional camp and the Court's Literalist
faction fundamentally had wanted to preserve rough competitive
marketplace equality, out of republicanist concerns for the eco-
nomic and political dangers thought to be posed by strong dispari-
ties in private economic power. In order to preserve such rough
equality, says Peritz, the Sherman and Literalist camps endorsed
145 As evidence of the prevalence of factional accommodation, Peritz
cites a series of 1908 cases "corroborating the established political econ-
omy of class, gender, and race." Id. at 48. The four cases noted are Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274
(1908); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Berea College v. Ken-
tucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
146 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
147 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
148 See Peritz, supra note 1, at 50.
149 Id. at 50.
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limitation and regulation of property rights when transactions
restrained "full and free competition."'
150
In contrast, Peritz argues, Chief Justice White and other mem-
bers of the Court's Rule of Reasonist faction fundamentally
wanted to protect individual rights of liberty and property. They
sympathized with private regulation of competition. Motivated by
anxiety over possible government restriction of the basic right to
buy, own and sell property, they hoped to block any broad, Liter-
alist application of the Sherman Act that would set limits on
the amount of property that could be held or used in interstate
commerce.'15
The liberal rule of reason established in Standard Oil, says
Peritz, largely dispensed with old "republicanist concerns about
economic power and corporate size."'152 In doing so, however, the
newly triumphant rule of reason did not sweepingly approve all
trusts. Peritz stresses that White's opinion explicitly acknowl-
edged that the exercise of freedom of trade sometimes could gen-
erate unreasonable and illegal restraints of trade. White declared
that the common law, and therefore the Sherman Act, recognized
that individual liberty of contract could be abused through unnat-
ural behavior going beyond the establishment of "normal and
usual" contracts. Two prominent examples of such perceived ille-
gitimate behavior, Peritz notes, were cartelization and the pur-
chase of rivals weakened by a successful campaign of predatory
pricing. Because the Court found that the personified trust defen-
dants in Standard Oil and in American Tobacco had engaged in
bad conduct that was unreasonable by common law standards, the
Court sustained the lower court decrees ordering the dissolution
of the two trusts., 53
150 Id. at 51.
151 See id.
152 Id. at 52.
153 Id. at 52. Peritz neatly summarizes his view of the Court's
approach to trust behavior by declaring that the Justices believed that,
"[L]ike any person, Rockefeller's Standard Oil was constrained to act
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d. Dr. Miles as a source of further illumination Peritz
believes that Justice Charles Evans Hughes' 1911 opinion for the
Court in Dr Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 154
illuminates the logic behind the Court's distinction between
always unreasonable cartels and only sometimes unreasonable
trusts. Peritz suggests a close link between the Court's condemna-
tion of resale price maintenance agreements in Dr. Miles and its
already well-established, across-the-board ban on cartel activity.
The Court's harsh treatment of both types of conduct, he says, fol-
lowed a long-established common law view that while a business
had the right to set the price at which its agents sell its own prop-
erty, a business had no right to establish the sales price of some-
one else's property. Within orthodox contemporary thinking,
Peritz argues, condemnation of resale price maintenance
agreements, which restrict a buyer's freedom to set prices inde-
pendently, flowed naturally from condemnation of cartel arrange-
ments, which restrict each participating seller's freedom to set
prices independently.1
55
Peritz further contends that in Dr. Miles the Rule of Reasonist
faction went along with "the Court's Literalist holding that price-
fixing is illegal per se"'156 because its members, in line with con-
temporary classical economics in general, did not distinguish
between rivalry among sellers operating at the same level in a dis-
tribution chain and rivalry between a manufacturer and its retail-
ers. Competition was thought to entail both of these forms of
rivalry, says Peritz, so "no one on the Court blinked at citing the
cartel cases as precedent."'
157
Peritz stresses that the Court's similar handling of both resale
price maintenance agreements and cartels contrasted sharply with
reasonably in the exercise of his property rights, his freedom of con-
tract." Id. at 56.
154 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
155 PERrrz, supra note 1, at 53-54.
156 See id. at 54.
157 Id.
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the Court's treatment of each large corporation as merely a single
individual in contemplation of law. Although he finds that this
was an understandable development in the cultural and economic
context of the times, Peritz emphasizes that this difference led to a
very important disparity in antitrust status. Cartels and resale
price maintenance agreements received automatic condemnation
as conspiracies to restrain individual liberty of action. "Individ-
ual" trusts, however, did not automatically violate the law, and
would only be condemned if they acted "unreasonably."' 158
e. Factional accommodation facilitated by a formal assump-
tion of equality In short, Peritz finds that the Supreme Court's
antitrust and constitutional law jurisprudence through 1911 arose
out of confrontations and accommodations between a "Literalist
faction" devoted to "a commercial egalitarianism expressed in the
rhetorics of industrial liberty and free competition" and a "Rule of
Reasonist faction" that was committed to limited government and
used freedom of contract rhetoric and energetic judicial review to
further that commitment.1 59 In Peritz's view, the key accommoda-
tions established between the factions by 1911 were made possi-
ble in substantial part by both factions' embrace of a formal
assumption of bargaining equality among contracting parties, an
assumption that ignored tremendous real-world disparities in
wealth and power.' 60
Peritz quotes Justice Mahlon Pitney's 1915 opinion for the
Court in Coppage v. Kansas'61 as a rare candid expression of the
sentiments that prompted this important transfactional embrace of
a formal assumption of equality. This assumption was embraced,
says Peritz, because the Court believed that to do otherwise, and
to allow more active government redistribution of wealth and
power, either would require abandonment of a regime of private
property and contract rights in favor of "public/socialized owner-
158 Id. at 55-56.
159 Id. at 56.
160 Id. at 57.
161 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
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ship" 162 or, alternatively, might lead to a descent into anarchic
social warfare. These fears, says Peritz, strongly propelled a con-
temporary judicial preoccupation to block government infringe-
ment of individual liberty and private property rights.
1 63
In Peritz's account, the Court's promulgation of the rule of
reason in Standard Oil signified the end of an era. In Peritz's
view, the close of this formative period of American antitrust law
marked the abandonment of the older political and economic
vision that originally had prompted Senator Sherman to urge con-
gressional passage of antitrust legislation:
The ideology of individualism working in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence and in the writings of the era's elite class no longer projected
an image of Jeffersonian yeomanry, of "small dealers and worthy
men" threatened by the new economic order. In place of a largely
republicanist conception founded in the importance of rough economic
equality, a recast ideology took normative content from a liberal con-
ception of individuals as threatened by oppressive and corrupt political
majorities. 16
B. Assessing the factional framework of Progressive Era
jurisprudence
In seeking to place the Supreme Court's early antitrust deci-
sions within the larger context of Progressive Era jurisprudence
and political economic thought, Peritz rightly notes that the Jus-
tices in this period sometimes disagreed sharply among them-
selves on fundamental issues of public regulation and private
rights. He aptly notes that larger visions of liberty and equality
heavily influenced the stance that individual Justices took on the
basic issues of competition policy posed in early Sherman Act
cases. In addition, he appropriately stresses that basic principles
of private property rights, freedom of contract, economic liberty,
and political freedom remained recurring, fundamental points of
162 PERrrz, supra note 1, at 57.
163 Id.
16 Id. at 58.
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reference for Supreme Court Justices in Progressive Era litigation
generally.
Peritz's central argument, however, is the more controversial
assertion that the Justices throughout this period coalesced into
two relatively stable oppositional factions, each of which was
composed of members sharing similar basic philosophical com-
mitments that were strongly distinguishable from the general
philosophical commitments shared by the members of the oppos-
ing group. Peritz's interpretation departs from other scholarly
interpretations of Progressive Era jurisprudence 165 about as
strongly as his account of the Sherman Act debates differs from
prior assessments of those deliberations. How strongly do the
cases he discusses support his contention?
1. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ALTERNATIVE ANTITRUST
STANDARDS: THE "EVERY DIRECT RESTRAINT" AND "ONLY UNREASONABLE
RESTRAINTS" TESTS It is true, of course, that until 1911, the Jus-
tices continued to be divided on the question of the appropriate
general formula to govern Sherman Act interpretation. By itself,
however, this fact is not sufficient to establish the more funda-
mental and thoroughgoing philosophical factionalism that Peritz
suggests. Continuing disagreement over an appropriate antitrust
formula might indicate such a broader and deeper philosophical
bifurcation if, first, each of the two alternative formulas was a rel-
atively unambiguous shorthand expression for one of the two con-
tending philosophical agendas Peritz depicts and, second, if each
Justice concurring in an antitrust opinion embracing one or
another of the two formulas intended thereby to accept the
165 See, e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
25-47 (1995); OWEN M. Fiss, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN
STATE, 1888-1910 (1993); MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 9-31 (1992); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTER-
PRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 93-101, 171-82 (1991); ALFRED
H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOP-
MENT 386-407, 416-26, 442-47, 453-56 (7th ed. 1991); Michael Les
Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning
and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIsT. REV. 293
(1985); May, supra note 54, at 262-83, 300-09.
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broader philosophical agenda associated with the particular for-
mula that antitrust opinion embraced. The case record, however,
does not strongly indicate that the contending general antitrust
standards had clear, fixed meanings; nor does it provide a solid
basis for drawing firm conclusions as to the broader philosophical
outlook of many of the Justices participating in Progressive Era
antitrust adjudication.
Both the "every direct restraint" formula and the "only unrea-
sonable restraints" standard proved, in practice, to be rather elas-
tic. Each could be adapted to a variety of policy orientations. For
example, Peritz notes that the "every direct restraint" approach
was used in cartel contexts variously to express an overriding
"republicanist" concern for the preservation of small dealers and
worthy men, 166 a concern for artificially increased consumer
prices stripped of such "republicanist" concerns, 167 and a liberal
preoccupation to protect a seller's individual liberty of business
decision-making from the operation of coercive price agreements
entered into with other rivals. 68 Similarly, the "only unreasonable
restraints" formula as used by Justice White in Trans-Missouri
expressed a case-by-case approach to the legality of cartels 69 that
Peritz finds absent in Chief Justice White's rule of reason opin-
ions in Standard Oil and American Tobacco. 17 0 The adaptability of
this same general formula of "only unreasonable restraints" per-
mitted different Justices to invoke it to support opposite results in
the very same case.' 7' In addition, the two formulas were suffi-
ciently flexible to allow an individual Justice to switch from one
166 PEmrZ, supra note 1, at 31.
167 Id. at 35.
168 Id. at 43, 53, 56.
169 Id. at 30-31.
170 Id. at 52.
171 In Northern Securities, Justice Brewer embraced the "only unrea-
sonable restraints" formula and applied it to condemn the same holding
company that Justice White and others, in dissent, approved under the
identical "only unreasonable restraints" standard. See 193 U.S. at 360-64
(Brewer, J., concurring), 364-400 (White, J., dissenting).
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formula to the other without ever altering his views as to the
legality of key types of challenged behavior." 2
Linking the two general formulas to sharply different philo-
sophical visions is further complicated by the substantial conver-
gence over time in the two standards' practical application. By the
turn of the century, despite their continued adherence to differ-
ently worded formulas, the initial proponents of each of the two
standards, Justices Peckham and White, already had indicated
substantial agreement with regard to which arrangements should
be prohibited and which allowed. Peritz relates that by this time
both Justices had accepted across-the-board condemnation of car-
tels directly affecting interstate commerce, whether on the ground
that all "restraints," in the technical meaning of this word, were
banned when they directly affected interstate commerce, or on the
ground that all such cartels fell within the category of "unreason-
able" restraints.1 73 In addition, by the turn of the century, both
Peckham and White also had expressed the view that partial
restraints deemed reasonably ancillary to a beneficial main trans-
action were legitimate under the Sherman Act.174 White's 1911
Standard Oil and American Tobacco opinions for the Court can be
interpreted as largely formalizing these same results, reached a
decade earlier by both White and Peckham, albeit under two sepa-
rate verbal banners. Substantial consensus as to what the Sherman
Act should be read to condemn, notwithstanding disagreement on
what general formula should be used as a shorthand for the Act's
meaning, also seemingly is indicated by Peritz's observation that
172 Justice Brewer initially had embraced Peckham's "every direct
restraint" approach in the railroad cartel cases. In 1904, in Northern
Securities, he switched to the "only unreasonable restraints" formula. He
immediately used it, however, as a vehicle both to continue his earlier
condemnation of all cartels directly affecting interstate commerce,
regardless of the "reasonableness" of their prices, and to condemn the
holding company established to effect the giant railroad combination
challenged in Northern Securities. See 193 U.S. 197, 360-64 (Brewer, J.,
concurring).
173 See PERrrZ, supra note 1, at 37.
174 See, e.g., May, supra note 54, at 308.
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the Northern Securities decision "was the last of only three
antitrust cases (out of about two dozen) that divided the Court in
antitrust's 'formative era' between 1890 and 1911."
175
2. THE LIMITED EVIDENCE AS TO PARTICULAR JURISTS' MOTIVATIONS
AND OUTLOOK Determination of the broader philosophical views
of the various individual Justices is complicated partly by the
number of changes in personnel that occurred on the Court
between the time of the first railroad cartel cases and the 1911
promulgation of the "classical" rule of reason. 176 Direct evidence
concerning the ideological or philosophical outlook animating the
votes of particular newer and older members in specific antitrust
cases frequently is rather limited, especially if the particular Jus-
tice did not offer a separate written opinion that clearly indicated
whether he did or did not agree with everything expressed in
another Justice's opinion. In a given instance, a particular Jus-
tice's concurrence, for example, might have resulted alternatively
from fervent adherence to the philosophical position articulated in
another Justice's opinion or simply from a felt duty to follow
established precedent even though at odds with the particular Jus-
tice's own policy preferences.
Peritz undoubtedly is right in contending that important differ-
ences of perspective persisted among the Justices, both in general
and with regard to antitrust law in particular, even after ongoing
unanimity was established in cartel cases by the turn of the cen-
tury. Peritz's discussion of the Court's 1904 and 1905 decisions in
Northern Securities and Lochner makes this clear. Those two
175 PERrrz, supra note 1, at 28.
176 The Court that decided Trans-Missouri in 1897 was composed of
Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Brewer, Brown, Field, Gray, Harlan,
Peckham, Shiras, and White. The High Court that considered the 1904
Northern Securities case consisted of Chief Justice Fuller and Justices
Brewer, Brown, Day, Harlan, Holmes, McKenna, Peckham, and White.
The members of the Court voting in the 1911 Standard Oil and American
Tobacco cases were Chief Justice White and Justices Day, Harlan,
Holmes, Hughes, Lamar, Lurton, McKenna, and Van Devanter. See THE
OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 124, at 985.
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cases and the later 1911 rule of reason decisions, however, ulti-
mately do not seem to support Peritz's specific factionalization
thesis nearly as strongly as he suggests they do.
3. THE COMPLEXITIES OF NORTHERN SECURITIES Northern Securities
presented issues of federal Commerce Clause power, government
authority to regulate property sale and acquisition, and the eco-
nomic, social, and political consequences of tighter versus looser
forms of combination that differed substantially from the issues
posed by the earlier railroad cartel and Addyston Pipe cases. Con-
ceivably, the differing voting alignment of Justices in Northern
Securities as compared with earlier antitrust cases may simply
have reflected various Justices' individual assessments of such
new issues. Peritz, however, explains the case instead as a sudden
factional membership crisis within a still continuing context of
contention between a Literalist and a Rule of Reasonist camp.
Peritz reports that Justice Harlan and the Justices who con-
curred in his opinion adhered to the old Literalist camp creed in
its original, pristine form. He finds, however, that two of the key
original founders of that camp, Justices Peckham and Brewer,
now "abandon[ed] their Literalist colleagues for the Rule of Rea-
sonist camp[.]" 77 These apostate Literalists, however, did not
immediately become the chief spokesmen for rule of reasonist
perspectives. Instead, Peritz notes, the chief proponents of such
perspectives in Northern Securities were the authors of the two
written dissenting opinions in the case, Justices White and
Holmes.
All of the Justices except for Justice Harlan and those concur-
ring in his opinion can be said to have rejected the verbal formula
of "every" restraint. For reasons already noted, however, this does
not necessarily demonstrate a strong continuing pattern of more
general ideological bifurcation on the Court, with a number of
Justices strongly sharing one particular set of basic philosophical
commitments under the banner of "every" direct restraint of trade
while the remaining members strongly shared a distinctly different
set of basic philosophical commitments under the alternative
177 See PERITZ, supra note 1, at 43.
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banner of "only unreasonable" restraints. More detailed examina-
tion of the antitrust thinking of the individual Justices participat-
ing in the Northern Securities decision seems to complicate rather
than strongly confirm the specific factional pattern Peritz suggests.
Two of the Justices concurring with Justice Harlan, Justices
Day and McKenna, had not participated in the early railroad cases
in which the "every" and "only unreasonable" restraints standards
had been first proposed and discussed. In separately concurring in
Northern Securities, Justice Brewer did not obviously alter his
outlook on anything more than what set of words best would
express his ostensibly unaltered, basic philosophic disposition on
antitrust issues. Brewer explicitly reaffirmed his original position
on cartels. Simultaneously, he expressly condemned the holding
company arrangement that both White and Holmes sought to
uphold on grounds of fundamental commitment to private prop-
erty rights and freedom of association. At most, it would seem,
Brewer's concurring opinion might support a claim that, far from
defecting, Brewer largely remained comfortable in his old camp
home but now wished he could steal the other camp's flag to fly
over his own ideological position.
178
Was Peckham an ideological deserter?' 79 The claim seems
premised on a belief that the nature of contemporary thought
178 Peritz stresses not only Brewer's adoption of the "only unreason-
able restraints" formula in Northern Securities, but also his affirmation of
each individual's right "to manage his own property and determine the
place and manner of its investment." 193 U.S. at 361 (Brewer, J., concur-
ring). All of the Justices writing opinions in Northern Securities, how-
ever, expressed agreement with this general principle. Harlan for the
plurality and Brewer, separately concurring, found no impairment of this
principle in their condemnation of the holding company challenged in the
case. They saw the holding company as the instrument of an unlawful
combination among individual shareholders which, they believed, was
not protected by the acknowledged right of a single individual acting
independently to buy and sell whatever and how much he or she might
choose. See 193 U.S. at 335, 354 (Harlan, J., for the plurality), 362
(Brewer, J., concurring).
179 See PERrrZ, supra note 1, at 43 (analyzing Peckham's "desertion to
the Rule of Reasonist faction").
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heavily forced jurists not simply to come to terms with antitrust
questions on an issue-by-issue basis, but continually to choose
between two different, particular sets of interrelated positions. In
this conception, the Literalist set offered a sweeping condemna-
tion of cartels, strong support for competition as the rule of trade,
and pointed concern over the possible dangers of augmented pri-
vate economic power. The posited Rule of Reasonist package, on
the other hand, offered forceful affirmation of the importance of
private property rights, freedom of contract and freedom of asso-
ciation, a tempered commitment to competition as the rule of
trade, and pointed concern to prevent the onset of either statism or
anarchic social warfare.
With such a starting premise, one can conclude that Peckham
"abandoned" not just the slogan but the "ideological camp" of
Literalism because, while his earlier positions in the cartel cases
were drawn from the Literalist set, his concurrence in the dissent-
ing opinions of Justices White and Holmes in the holding com-
pany stock acquisition case of Northern Securities indicated
strong belief in the protection of private property rights, freedom
of contract, and freedom of association.
It seems quite possible, however, that Peckham never actually
changed his basic philosophical outlook during his years on the
high court. Peritz cites no instance in which Peckham ever
changed his mind or his vote on the issues he actually addressed
as "leader of the Literalists" in the earlier cartel cases-specifi-
cally, the unavailability of any reasonable price or ruinous compe-
tition defense for cartels, the undesirability of the decline of small
dealers and worthy men, or the harmfulness of increased prices
achieved through cartel activity. From the day he joined the
Court, Peckham may well have been strongly inclined to hold the
views he expressed in the cartel cases right alongside strong con-
cerns for excessive government regulation of other, more "ordi-
nary" or "natural" types of contracting activity that he might have
thought to be sharply distinguishable from cartel agreements. He
also may well have had precisely the same inclinations on the day
he died. In short, Peckham may only have been reacting to the dif-
ference in the specific issues presented in the early cartel cases
Factionalfoundations : 287
and in Northern Securities. In taking the positions he did in these
cases, he may have done no more than to express separate aspects
of a single overall general outlook that he maintained essentially
intact throughout his tenure on the Court.
180
What about Holmes? Given the distinctiveness of his thought,
assimilating Holmes to either half of a perceived philosophical
bifurcation among the other Justices of the High Court would
seem a formidable task. Peritz associates Holmes with the Rule of
Reasonist faction' 8' because of his dissent from Harlan's Literalist
condemnation of the combination of two major railroads through
the holding company challenged in Northern Securities. In plac-
ing Holmes in the Rule of Reasonist camp, Peritz stresses
Holmes' expressed concern to uphold private property rights, lib-
erty of contract, and the freedom to establish reasonable combina-
tions. He also emphasizes Holmes' hostility to any extreme
interpretation of the Sherman Act that might insist upon the disin-
tegration of society into atomistic warfare. It is more than a little
180 His concurrence without separate written opinion in the dissenting
opinions of White and Holmes, of course, might well be taken to indicate
at least a new acceptance of the "only unreasonable" restraints termi-
nology for Sherman Act interpretation. This does not necessarily mean,
however, that Peckham in 1904 hoped for any different results in
antitrust cases than he ever might have desired before. Starting with his
very first antitrust opinions, Peckham had made it clear that by "every"
he did not mean "every," or to put it another way, that "restraint of trade"
was a technical term that did not actually include everything that might
be alleged to come within the phrase. See United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 329 (1897); United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898). The facts of Northern Securities
may have given him new concern that his earlier words might be misin-
terpreted badly. Brewer, indeed, in that very case expressly justified his
turn to the formula of "only unreasonable" restraints on the ground that
he now perceived too great a danger of misinterpretation in the "every"
restraint test he previously had embraced along with Peckham. See 193
U.S. at 364. In doing so, however, Brewer made it clear that adoption of
the terminology that Justice White had first urged did not signify or
require abandonment of any of the substantive positions he and Peckham
previously had taken in earlier antitrust cases. See id. at 360-61.
181 See, e.g., PERrrz, supra note 1, at 27.
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problematic, however, to see Justices Holmes, Peckham, White,
and Brewer and Chief Justice Fuller as strong philosophical com-
patriots as of 1904 in ongoing, fundamental contention with an
opposing ideological camp staffed by Justices Harlan, Brown,
Day, and McKenna. This is especially true if the two factions are
to be identified by a distinctive similarity in their members' orien-
tations toward public regulation of property rights, liberty of con-
tract, and freedom of association.
4. NORTHERN SECURITIES IN THE LIGHT OF LOCHNER The problem is
heightened rather than lessened by Peritz's reference to Lochner
and the larger pattern of contemporary Supreme Court jurispru-
dence. Peritz tries hard to picture the 1905 opinions in Lochner as
a confirmation and continuing reflection of the factional split he
finds evident in the 1904 Northern Securities opinions. Peritz
declares that the two cases "raised similar questions about liberty
of contract, economic inequality, and the legitimate scope of gov-
ernment regulation."'182 In both cases, he notes, one group of Jus-
tices found that majoritarian government regulation had exceeded
its legitimate scope and had transgressed freedom of contract. In
addition, he argues, in each of the cases, the two opposing fac-
tions were animated by conflicting general visions of political
economy and "sharply differing commitments to equality."
Specifically, "While the Harlan faction paid attention to the eco-
nomic circumstances in each case, both Peckham and White pro-
ceeded on an assumption of formal equality."'183
Peritz also finds continuity between the two cases in the philo-
sophical, and therefore factional, orientation of Holmes in particu-
lar. In both cases, he notes, Holmes expressed a belief in only
limited majoritarianism and a conviction that certain fundamental
principles set boundaries for government regulation. For Holmes,
Peritz stresses, a fundamental principle limiting regulatory expres-
sions of dominant public opinion was the principle of liberty to
associate and form social and commercial combinations.
182 Id. at 45.
183 Id. at 48.
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Taken together, says Peritz, the various opinions in Northern
Securities and Lochner most clearly displayed the contemporary
"rhetorical confrontations between Supreme Court factions
espousing free competition (or, to their opposition, social con-
flict) and freedom of contract (or, to their opposition, anti-
majoritarianism)."'
8 4
If Northern Securities and Lochner together can be interpreted
as strong, clear evidence of the continuation of a fundamental
philosophical split on the Court expressed through an ongoing
confrontation between a free competition faction and a freedom of
contract faction, one might wonder what it would take to cast seri-
ous doubt on such a view. How strong a picture of factional conti-
nuity and internal camp solidarity do those two cases in fact
present? The Justices that Peritz includes in the Literalist faction
in the 1904 Northern Securities case are: Harlan, Brown, Day, and
McKenna. Peritz locates all the remaining Justices in the Rule of
Reasonist camp, namely: Justices White, Holmes, Brewer, and
Peckham, and Chief Justice Fuller. In Lochner a year later, how-
ever, Peritz finds in the Literalist camp Justices Harlan, Day,
White, and Holmes (two Northern Securities Literalists and two
Northern Securities Rule of Reasonists). Simultaneously, he finds
that by 1905, the Rule of Reasonist camp had come to be inhab-
ited by Chief Justice Fuller and Justices Peckham, Brewer,
Brown, and McKenna (three Northern Securities Rule of Reason-
ists and two Northern Securities Literalists).
5. ATTITUDES ABOUT CARTELS, MAJORITARIAN REGULATION, AND
ASSUMPTIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY AS CRITERIA FOR FACTIONAL IDENTI-
FICATION The thesis that until 1911 the Progressive Era Court was
philosophically split into a free competition faction and its free-
dom of contract opponent can be explored further by focusing at
greater length on three of the key dimensions of factional identifi-
cation that Peritz emphasizes, specifically, the various Justices'
views on cartels, majoritarian regulation, and assumptions of for-
mal equality.
184 Id.
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First, consider the evolving pattern of High Court thinking
about cartels. Peritz notes what at first might seem a strangely
rapid coalescence in the various Justices' approach to cartels and
offers a possible explanation for at least the first appearance of
Supreme Court unanimity on this issue. His explanation for the
continuation of such unanimity over the next two decades despite
the later absence of the special circumstances that he claims first
made unanimity possible, however, seems to leave open signifi-
cant questions that might usefully be explored further in the
future. 8 5
185 Peritz suggests that during most of the 1890s, fundamental philo-
sophical disagreement over the appropriate treatment of cartels was cen-
tral to the distinction between the two factions. See id. at 30-36. He notes
that as early as the 1899 case of Addyston Pipe, the two factions unani-
mously could embrace Justice Peckham's opinion for the Court that con-
demned the bid rigging arrangement challenged in the case. Id. at 36.
This, however, is explained not as an absence of continued strong fac-
tional thinking, but instead as an indication of silent accommodation
among previously established factions that remained as alive as ever. The
special facts of Addyston Pipe, involving a bid rigging scheme that was
deemed to be fraudulent and that had established prices that were deemed
to be unreasonable in fact, he says, allowed both factions to join in the
result of the case. Id. at 36-37. Peritz notes, however, that in almost all
cartel cases thereafter the Court continued to condemn cartels unani-
mously, even in the absence of the special facts that had allowed agree-
ment in Addyston Pipe. See id. at 37-38. This would seem to leave
unanswered the question whether White and other Justices who initially
wanted a reasonable price defense went along in later cases because they
had changed their policy preference or merely because they deferred to
established precedent. If White and other Rule of Reasonists completely
reversed their basic philosophical outlook on cartels in such a short space
of time, it seems harder to conceive of the High Court as divided into two
factions firmly grounded in two fundamentally different sets of philo-
sophical commitments. If, conversely, by the turn of the century, the
members of the Rule of Reasonist faction concurred in the Court's rejec-
tion of any reasonable price or ruinous competition defense merely out of
deference to precedent, then it seems problematic to include either
Brewer or Holmes in that ideological camp as of 1904. This is because
both Brewer and Holmes in their Northern Securities opinions pointedly
affirmed their philosophical agreement with the Court's Trans-Missouri
and Joint Traffic precedents. See 193 U.S, 197, 360 (Brewer, J., concur-
ring), 405 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Second, consider the implications of relying on comparative lev-
els of deference to majoritarian regulation as a basis for assigning
Justices to one or another of the two basic factions Peritz pictures.
The Justices repeatedly did disagree when reviewing legislation
challenged as an infringement of private property rights or liberty of
contract. It seems very difficult, however, to characterize Justices
Peckham and Brewer, either before or after 1904, as falling within
the half of the High Court bench that was comparatively less con-
cerned with the protection of private property rights or liberty of
contract in general. 86 As a result, even though Peckham and Brewer
until 1904 embraced the Literalist antitrust standard of "every direct
restraint on interstate commerce" it is problematic to associate them
strongly and exclusively with a philosophical faction defined heav-
ily on the basis of a comparatively less fervent commitment to free-
dom of contract and private property rights.
Reliance on relative wariness toward majoritarian economic
regulation complicates assignment of Justice White's rhetorical
residency as well. If factional membership is seen as long-lived
rather than merely a matter of the voting alignment in a single
case, it becomes necessary to explain not only White's stance in
various antitrust cases, but also why he dissented in Lochner and
thus aligned himself with what Peritz terms the "Harlan faction"
in opposition to the Peckham-led majority that struck down the
maximum hours law for New York bakers. It also becomes neces-
sary to explain why White found constitutional the regulatory
measures challenged in a number of other major cases decided by
a divided Court. 187
186 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 165, at 32-33, 134; Paul Kens, Peck-
ham, Rufus Wheeler, in THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 124, at
626-27; May, supra note 54, at 303-04. Brewer and Peckham, for exam-
ple, were the only two Justices who dissented from the Court's approval
of a maximum hours law for miners in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366,
398 (1898).
187 See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321 (1903); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Ham-
mond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909). Cf also Pollock
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 706-15 (1895) (White, J.,
dissenting).
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Holmes, too, seems to resist easy classification within Peritz's
suggested general .factional framework if deference to majoritari-
anism is emphasized. It clearly is true that everyone, including
Holmes, believed that there were constitutional limits on the
power of majoritarian legislatures. In addition, Holmes' dissent in
Northern Securities did strongly express wariness of excessive
federal regulation and a quite sympathetic view toward the expan-
sion of combination activity in society. At the same time, how-
ever, of everyone on the Court, Holmes in general advocated the
stance of greatest judicial deference to legislative action. It thus
might have surprised him to be considered, as of 1904-1905, a
leading philosophical compatriot of Justice Peckham, with whom
he disagreed so sharply in Lochner itself.
What of the third noted dimension of demarcation, i.e., the
Justices' comparative receptivity to an assumption of formal
equality? Use of this criterion similarly does not consistently sup-
port the factional identifications Peritz assigns to various Justices.
For example, in Lochner itself, both Holmes and White rejected
an assumption of formal equality. At least by itself, this would
weigh in favor of including both White and Holmes in the Literal-
ist camp rather than in the Rule of Reasonist camp because, in
Peritz's account, it was the former and not the latter camp that
was relatively more attentive to economic reality and less inclined
to embrace a judicial assumption of formal equality, at least until
1911.
6. THE 1911 RULE OF REASON CASES What, then, of the crowning
events of formative era antitrust jurisprudence, the 1911 opinions
establishing a new rule of reason in Standard Oil and American
Tobacco? Peritz declares that these decisions represented the final
factional accommodation that brought this first great era of Amer-
ican antitrust law to a close. He argues that this accommodation
consisted of several key, interrelated elements. On the one hand,
the Court abandoned earlier republicanist concerns with economic
power and corporate size and creatively indicated that in contem-
plation of law each giant trust or corporation was to be treated as
merely a single individual rather than a combination. On the other
hand, the Court continued to condemn all cartels directly affecting
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interstate commerce and declared trusts to be in violation of the
Sherman Act when they engaged in unfair and improper forms of
business rivalry. Peritz contends that this 1911 accommodation
between rhetorical camps was made possible in large part because
by 1911 both factions finally had come to embrace a formal
assumption of bargaining equality among participants in eco-
nomic life, an assumption that ignored the great disparities in
wealth and power that actually prevailed in the economy.
How persuasive is this view of the origin, meaning, and sig-
nificance of the rule of reason announced in Standard Oil and
American Tobacco? First, there is the question of the asserted
cross-factional abandonment of republicanist concerns with eco-
nomic power and corporate size. It is true that the decrees in these
two cases did not effectively dissipate the defendants' market
power. Nevertheless, it seems a little strong to conclude that,
rhetorically, the Court largely discarded older concerns about eco-
nomic power and the expanding dimensions of business organiza-
tion. A number of passages in Chief Justice White's opinion for
the Court in Standard Oil seem to indicate significant continuing
concerns for overweening economic power and corporate size.
White emphasized, for instance, the "vast amount of property and
the possibilities for far-reaching control"'88 that the defendants had
amassed by the 1880s and the disturbing fact that in later years
Standard Oil of New Jersey acquired "an enlarged and more per-
fect sway and control over the trade and commerce in petroleum
and its products."' 89 Concern for economic power and corporate
size also seems to be suggested in a passage a few pages later in
White's opinion, in which White stressed that various activities
challenged in the case "necessarily involved the intent to drive
others from the field and to exclude them from their right to trade,
and thus accomplish the mastery which was the end in view."'190
188 221 U.S. at 70.
189 Id. at 71.
190 Id. at 76.
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Peritz's view may be that while such passages might suggest a
concern with economic power and corporate size they do not sug-
gest a specifically republicanist concern linked to the particular
political as well as economic fears that he believes earlier had
animated Senator Sherman and the Court's Literalists. In recent
years, historians have engaged in extensive scholarly debate over
the appropriate usage of the terms "republican" and "liberal" and
the extent to which various persons and ideas convincingly can be
identified exclusively with one or the other of these two
"rhetorics" or languages of discourse.19' Peritz does not discuss
this literature at any length or relate in much detail why, for
example, Peckham's early expression of concern for the loss of
small dealers and worthy men could not also have been embraced
by contemporaries with a "classically liberal" outlook premised
on a vision of unconcentrated markets driven by the active pres-
ence of many such roughly equal small dealers and worthy men.
Similarly, he does not explain directly why the passages just
quoted from White's opinion in Standard Oil necessarily indicate
the absence of any lingering republicanist sensibilities on the
Court. In any event, whatever one infers about White's own
views, the direct evidence seems somewhat limited to draw strong
final conclusions regarding the extent to which various other Jus-
tices had or had not fully abandoned any significant trace of older
republicanist concerns over economic power or corporate size by
1911.
In asserting that the Court discarded such concerns in the 1911
rule of reason cases, Peritz relies heavily on the Court's personifi-
cation of corporations and trusts. One of Peritz's leading criti-
cisms of competition policy from the 1890s until the New Deal
is that the Supreme Court adopted a nonuniform antitrust
approach to combinations by treating each large trust and each
large corporation as merely a single individual in contemplation
191 See, e.g., JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE
HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992); ISAAC KRAMNICK, REPUBLICANISM & BOUR-
GEOIS RADICALISM 260-88 (1990); Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The
Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11 (1992); Gordon Wood, The
Virtues and the Interests, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 11, 1991, at 32.
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of law. In Standard Oil, he finds, the Court embraced per se con-
demnation of price-fixing combinations 192 but treated a huge trust
as merely a single individual, a classification that meant that a
Sherman Act violation would be found only if the trust engaged in
abusive forms of business rivalry. Peritz cites to very little in
Chief Justice White's opinions in Standard Oil and American
Tobacco that directly bears on the treatment of a large corporation
or trust as a single individual. Instead, to support his point, Peritz
chiefly points to indications of the growing personification of cor-
porations and trusts, but not cartels, within popular culture, the
Court's increasing treatment of corporations as persons in various
nonantitrust contexts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and
certain passages from White's dissenting opinion in Northern
Securities.
The list of contemporary factors supporting the treatment of a
corporation as a single individual for federal antitrust purposes
readily could be expanded further. One might note, for example,
section 8 of the Sherman Act itself as passed in 1890.193 It is not
sufficient, however, to find that at the time of the 1911 rule of rea-
son cases there was an increasing legal and cultural tendency to
personify corporations.
Conceding that this general tendency existed, it nevertheless
remains difficult to find in either Standard Oil or American
Tobacco itself an underlying judicial premise that the Court was
facing "a question of individual conduct rather than an instance of
combination."' 194 Neither opinion so characterized the record
192 See PnRrrz, supra note 1, at 52.
193 Section 8 of the Act declared:
That the word "person" or "persons," wherever used in this act
shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing
under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the
laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws
of any foreign country.
Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1994)).
194 PERIrz, supra note 1, at 50.
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before the Court. Indeed, in both cases the Court heavily and
explicitly stressed illegitimate combination activity as the basis
for finding a violation of the Sherman Act. 95
Finally, what of Peritz's contention that the unanimity in the
1911 rule of reason cases can be attributed substantially to a
cross-factional willingness formally to assume equality among
parties in economic life? Even though Peritz finds that in Lochner
the Court's two factions differed sharply in their willingness to
accept an assumption of formal equality, he concludes that 6 years
later the two factions were able to reach a landmark general
accommodation in substantial part because both factions by then
had come to embrace exactly this assumption. As evidence for
this change of heart, Peritz does not cite to developments through
1911, but instead points primarily to Justice Mahlon Pitney's 1915
opinion in Coppage, which delared unconstitutional a state statute
banning "yellow dog" contracts. As Peritz notes, Pitney's opinion
is one of the most striking contemporary Supreme Court state-
ments in favor of a formal legal assumption of equality among
contracting parties. Pitney's opinion, however, seems an odd
one to pick to support a claim that, by 1911, both factions
on the Court embraced an assumption of formal equality.
Pitney did not join the High Court bench until 1912. Of the seven
Justices who were on the Court in 1911 and still on the Court
in 1915, four joined Pitney's opinion 96 while the other three
strongly dissented.
97
195 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 70-77 (1911);
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181-84 (1911).
196 These were Justices Lamar, McKenna, and Van Devanter and
Chief Justice White.
197 Justices Holmes and Day each wrote a dissenting opinion. 236
U.S. 1, 26-27 (Holmes, J., dissenting); 27-42 (Day, J., dissenting).
Justice Charles Evans Hughes concurred in Day's opinion. Since the
time that the decisions in Standard Oil and American Tobacco were
announced, Justice Harlan had been replaced by Justice Pitney and Jus-
tice Lurton had been replaced by Justice McReynolds. See THE OXFORD
COMPANION, supra note 124, at 985.
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7. COMPETITION POLICY IN THE SUPREME COURT THROUGH 1911
Peritz's thought-provoking discussion of the early cases signifi-
cantly advances his overarching argument that the history of
American competition policy since 1890 has not been simply a
"progression of better economic or political ideas gaining consen-
sus."' 98 It also substantiates his claim that the Justices in this
period centrally were concerned with a broader range of basic val-
ues than simply the norm of robust competition. Peritz also pre-
sents considerable evidence that jurisprudential outlooks and
doctrines concerning competition, property rights, efficiency, lib-
erty, and equality historically have been "contestable social and
political choices, [rather than] products of (super)natural, histori-
cal, economic, or logical necessity."'199 As in his discussion of the
Sherman Act debates, however, Peritz at times seems a bit too
determined to fit diverse understandings and applications of these
basic principles within a particular pattern and structure of sharp,
ongoing factional division that often seems at odds with the his-
torical record.
III. The prelude to postclassical economics and the
New Deal: cooperative economic competition
and threatening political rivalry
A. From Standard Oil to the New Deal
After addressing rhetorical rivalry in the Sherman Act debates
and early case law, Peritz next turns to developments during the
turbulent two decades following the 1911 rule of reason cases. He
focuses particularly on the consequences of World War I mobi-
lization, expanded state and federal regulation, increasing trade
associationalism, the ongoing struggles of organized labor, and
conflicts over free speech rights. Peritz concludes that these
developments called into question the liberal political economic
assumption that antagonistic competition was the natural condi-
tion of relations between individual citizens and majoritarian
198 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 5.
199 Id. at 8.
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government, between commercial rivals, and between workers
and their employers. As had been true through 1911, says Peritz,
"competition and property rhetorics, inspired by commitments to
liberty and equality, would shape the policy arguments posed to
resolve such questions. 200
Peritz relates that in the wake of the Court's 1911 antitrust
opinions, an American public identifying with the earlier image of
beleaguered "small dealers and worthy men" feared that most
trusts would be approved under a rule of reason that only con-
denmed business size or economic power if it was conjoined with
bad acts. 201 The 1914 Clayton and Federal Trade Commission
Acts passed in response to such concerns established new prohibi-
tions that specifically targeted threats to competition. Peritz notes,
however, that this legislative response did not simply resuscitate
the commitment to "full and free competition" originally embraced
by the Sherman and Literalist factions. By 1914, he relates, the
image of competition itself was changing to reflect new "open
competition" ideas that promoted cooperation among rivals as a
way to generate a superior form of competition.
202
Peritz notes that by 1914 the Supreme Court already had
begun an extended period of strongly conservative jurisprudence.
Animated by the commitment to freedom of contract that earlier
prompted the Court's opinions in both Lochner and Standard Oil,
"the Supreme Court under Chief Justices White and Taft was
unrelenting in its protection of commercial activity from legisla-
tive 'intervention'. ''203 This pattern, says Peritz, reflected a judi-
cial belief that "free competition meant freedom from government
administration, but not freedom from concerted private adminis-
tration of markets. ' 204 Peritz focuses particularly on four aspects
200 Id. at58.
201 Id. at 61.
202 Id. at 64-66.
203 Id. at 66.
204 Id. Peritz cites as examples of the Supreme Court majority's hos-
tility to congressional economic regulation the Court's 1920 decisions in
United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) and FTC v. Gratz,
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of the Court's jurisprudence between 1911 and 1933: (1) its con-
demnation of public and private price fixing; (2) its embrace of a
new formulation of the rule of reason and its growing acceptance
of trade association activity; (3) its hostility to labor associations;
and (4) its differing treatment of political and commercial speech.
1. HOSTILITY TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRICE FIXING During the
1920s, state regulation of rates repeatedly posed the important
issue of government power to limit an individual's right to estab-
lish the sales price for his or her own property. The Supreme
Court consistently rejected state power to regulate the rates of
businesses outside a narrowly defined category of businesses
"affected with a public interest," a category which had come to
include little more than utilities and railroads. 20 5 Peritz notes that
253 U.S. 421 (1920). Peritz notes that in U.S. Steel, Justice McKenna, for
the Court, departed from freedom-of-contract-based classical economics.
Instead, says Peritz, he embraced rising neoclassical economic views that
treated as competitive "anything short of complete market control."
PERrIZ, supra note 1, at 67. "Because U.S. Steel controlled only 80 to 90
percent of its major product markets," Peritz notes, "it had not achieved,
in McKenna's estimation, monopoly power." Id. Simultaneously, U.S.
Steel reaffirmed Standard Oil's doctrine that, in any event, tremendous
corporate size and industry domination were not enough by themselves to
constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. Justice McKenna's opinion
also reflected a displacement of classical by neoclassical, market-based
rather than freedom-of-contract-based, economics in its treatment of the
informal cooperation that had developed between U.S. Steel and its
rivals. McKenna approved this behavior on the ground that it helped to
stabilize a financially risky market. Id.
Justice McReynolds' 1920 opinion for the Court in FTC v. Gratz,
says Peritz, expressed the Court's very different level of tolerance for
public, as opposed to private, market regulation. In that case, the Court
denied the Federal Trade Commission authority under the Federal Trade
Commission statute to identify and enjoin as "unfair methods of competi-
tion" any acts going beyond conduct already prohibited under judicially
created common law, even where an act manifestly had been considered
an unfair method of competition by the Congress that passed the Clayton
and Federal Trade Commission Acts. Id. at 67-68.
205 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 72. Peritz notes that a divided Court
refused, for example, to uphold either New York's regulation of prices
for theater ticket agents or Tennessee's effort to regulate retail gasoline
prices. Id. at 73-75.
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the Justices disagreed sharply on whether this judicial determina-
tion that "public price-fixing was illegal per se" was consistent
with the Court's 1927 opinion in United States v. Trenton Potter-
ies Co.,206 finding "private price fixing illegal regardless of intent
and competitive effect." Justice Sutherland and other conservative
members of the Court believed that "all naked price-fixing,
whether public or private, was unacceptable, because such associ-
ations coerced individuals. Neither political majorities nor domi-
nant cartels were permitted to trample individual liberty of
contract, whose purest practice was the right to set sales prices. '207
Other Justices, however, such as Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, the
author of the Court's Trenton Potteries opinion, analogized public
price setting to the operation of competitive markets rather than to
the operation of private cartels. Instead of reflecting a cartel-like
intent to increase prices above fair, competitive levels and to aug-
ment economic power, public rate setting stepped in to reestablish
prices that were fair to both producers and consumers when the
normal regulative force of competition had been weakened or had
proven unworkable in particular circumstances. 208
2. A NEW RULE OF REASON AND GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF TRADE
ASSOCIATIONS Spurred by the War Industries Board's success in
organizing wartime production and distribution, by Herbert
Hoover's promotional efforts as Secretary of Commerce, and by
the related writings of private enthusiasts for such a new form of
''cooperative competition," trade associations proliferated by the
thousands during the 1920s. In part, such associations represented
a desire to improve economic conditions through exchanges of
information that would lead to market stabilization and thereby
avoid both ruinous competition and market monopolization. 209
Peritz notes that a number of developments in this period
forced reconsideration of the relationships among competition,
206 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
207 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 74.
208 Id. at 74-75.
209 Id. at 75-78.
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private property, individual liberty, and economic inequality. 210
Wartime mobilization, postwar trade associationalism and major
new theoretical developments all called into question older classi-
cal liberal conceptions of individualistic market rivalry. For
example, recently developed neoclassical economic perspectives,
says Peritz, did not emphasize market competition as the prod-
uct of individual exercise of liberty of contract, but instead ana-
lyzed competition functionally with regard to particular market
settings.
211
An even newer theoretical challenge to such classical visions
appeared in Justice Brandeis' 1918 opinion for the Court in Board
of Trade of Chicago v. United States.2 2 The "classical" rule of
reason announced in Standard Oil, says Peritz, pointed to a deter-
mination of individual case results based on a loosely deductive
application of the implications of the fundamental general princi-
ple of liberty of contract. In contrast, Brandeis' "postclassical"
rule of reason pointed to a determination of legality or illegality
in particular cases based on a loosely inductive examination of
the particular facts of each case, in an effort to determine the
competitive effects of challenged practices.
213
After the First World War, the Department of Justice brought a
series of cases challenging trade association activities, analogiz-
ing them to the cartels condemned by the Supreme Court in earlier
cases. Justice John H. Clarke's 1921 opinion for the Court in
American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States,214 says Peritz,
reflected the Supreme Court's early suspicion of trade associa-
tions in general. Clarke inferred that the particular information
exchange program challenged in that case involved an agreement
to fix prices, accomplished through the coordinating efforts of the
Association's Manager of Statistics and "the disposition of men
210 Id. at 78.
211 Id. at 79.
212 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
213 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 80.
214 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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'to follow their most intelligent competitors'."215 In these early
cases, a majority of the Justices generally perceived not the
promotion of more intelligent and better informed individual
competitive decision making, but instead another variety of anti-
competitive price fixing.216
The Court's 1925 opinion in Maple Flooring Manufacturers
Association v. United States217 ushered in a dramatically altered
approach to trade association data dissemination. Written by Jus-
tice Harlan Fiske Stone, the Court's opinion strongly endorsed
information exchanges within trade associations, as long as they
did not extend to explicit price fixing. 218 Adopting a "Brandeisian
rule of reason" focusing on the particular facts of each individual
case, the Court now demanded clear proof of market power, bad
purpose and anticompetitive effects in order to establish that a
particular information exchange program violated the Sherman
Act. In the view of the Court majority, Peritz notes, the absence of
an explicit agreement on price indicated an absence of coercion
or restriction of individual decision making. The Court found nei-
ther bad purpose nor anticompetitive effect in the information
exchange program in Maple Flooring. Instead, the majority found
215 PERMTz, supra note 1, at 83 (quoting American Column and Lum-
ber, 257 U.S. at 399). Both Holmes and Brandeis dissented. Peritz notes
that, surprisingly in light of his Chicago Board of Trade opinion, Bran-
deis echoed White's earlier emphasis on the restriction of individual pri-
vate property rights and freedom of contracting as the test of legality and
declared it inappropriate to judge the challenged activity according to its
impact on the price level. Finding no coercion of individual action, Bran-
deis concluded that the challenged data dissemination program merely
allowed better informed individual business decision making to the bene-
fit of society as a whole. Two years later, Justice McReynolds, for a
unanimous Court, stressed even more strongly the element of coercion of
individual members, in condemning an information exchange program
that, in part, involved an ordinary price-fixing agreement. Id. at 83-85.
216 Id. at 82-86.
217 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
218 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 87-88. Peritz notes that when he had
served a few years earlier as Attorney General, Stone had participated in
initiation of the suit as a potentially good "test case." Id. at 87.
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that, notwithstanding the defendants' 70 percent share of the mar-
ket, the arrangement served the public interest. Specifically, it
beneficially tended to "stabilize trade and industry, to produce
fairer price levels and to avoid the waste which inevitably attends
the unintelligent conduct of economic enterprise, 219 by promoting
more rational competitive activity.
Peritz finds that the Court's new approach to data dissemina-
tion cases established a
unified antitrust treatment of loose and tight combinations: Unless a
trade association or a corporate person engaged in flagrantly anti-com-
petitive conduct-open and obvious price control of some sort-the
restraint was judged as reasonable. The new Rule of Reason, a juridi-
cal reformulation of neoclassical economics and its focus on markets
rather than individual freedom of contract, embraced the logic of
cooperative competition. 220
3. THE CONTRASTING ANTIPATHY TOWARD LABOR ASSOCIATIONS
Peritz argues that the Court's adoption of a new, postclassical
Brandeisian rule of reason raised new questions about the legal
treatment, respectively, of cartels, labor associations, trade associ-
ations, and trusts. Under the "classical" rule of reason announced
in 1911, says Peritz, the Court had come to apply cartel doctrine
to both trade and labor associations, while condemning corpora-
tions and trusts only if they acted unreasonably. The Court's
acceptance of the newer version of the rule of reason by the mid-
dle of the 1920s allowed it to approve trade associations through a
sympathetic examination of particular circumstances. It did not,
however, lead to a similar, more receptive consideration of labor
associations: "Instead, labor associations were still judged accord-
ing to the classical cartel doctrine otherwise reserved for illegiti-
mate political action. Like public price-fixing, labor union
activities were illegal per se."
221
219 268 U.S. at 583. See Peritz, supra note 1, at 87.
220 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 88.
221 Id. at 89-90.
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Peritz finds that leading lawyers, economists and federal
judges perceived labor associations to be physically threatening
political combinations of individuals rather than economic entities
competing with employers. 222 In contrast, trade associations were
seen as nonpolitical, efficiency-enhancing economic organiza-
tions. Disadvantageous treatment of labor, Peritz notes, came to
be justified not only on the basis of older classical conceptions,
but also through the invocation of new neoclassical economic per-
spectives. Although it would have been eminently possible to
imagine inefficiency and anticompetitive effects from both trusts
and trade associations and efficiency benefits from unionization,
Peritz argues, new neoclassical economic analyses attributed an
intrinsic tendency to restrict competition and output only to
unions.22
3
Peritz declares that one of the key differences between the
new, market-focused neoclassical economics and older, liberty of
contract based classical economics was the new economics' "hon-
zontalization of competition."224 Citing Holmes' dissents in Vege-
lahn v. Guntner 25 and in Dr. Miles as representative of older
conceptions, Peritz relates that Holmes, like others influenced by
classical perspectives, did not distinguish vertical from horizontal
aspects of economic rivalry.226 Holmes, says Peritz, thought that
222 Id. at 90-100. This view, he says, contributed, for example, to the
extremely widespread granting of antilabor injunctions by federal courts
during the 1920s. See id. at 94.
223 Id. at 90-100. Peritz contends that while trade associations
increasingly were pictured as efficiency promoting and competition
enhancing examples of new management science by Herbert Hoover and
other promoters, and trusts often were declared justified by scale
economies, neoclassical economists such as John B. Clark rejected claims
that increased labor organization might increase labor efficiency and con-
cluded instead that such activity only could reduce output and generate
higher manufacturing costs. Id. at 95.
224 Id. at 95.
225 167 Mass. 92, 104-09, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079-82 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
226 PERrrz, supra note 1, at 96.
Factionalfoundations : 305
competition prevailed not only among sellers or among buyers,
but also between buyers and sellers. In contrast, under the new
economics,
rivalry was no longer understood as a two-dimensional process.
Although horizontal rivalry among buyers or among sellers became
the object of close "economic" scrutiny, vertical rivalry between buy-
ers and sellers became a "political" question of bargaining power, of
wealth distribution. Political economy was effectively partitioned into
vertical and horizontal planes, into economic and political domains.
227
Accordingly, wage disputes now were conceived to be a matter of
wealth redistribution between classes rather than a matter of effi-
ciency, i.e., "a question of politics rather than a question of eco-
nomics." 2
28
In Peritz's view, this newly conceived dichotomy between hor-
izontal economic rivalry and vertical political struggle reinforced
the view of labor unions as large aggregations of individuals that
not only promoted inefficiency and wealth redistribution, but also
ominously threatened physical harm to persons and property.
"Employers and employees did not 'compete'," Peritz notes,
"they engaged in 'struggle' or 'conflict'. '"229 As a result, while
both trade and labor associations injured the property rights of
others and both were involved in rivalry, the use of physical force
by government and business and the frequent issuance of injunc-
tions were deemed justified responses to the activities of labor
associations but not to the activities of trade associations.
230
227 Id. at 95.
228 Id. at 96. Peritz stresses, however, that this was a change in analy-
sis rather than in end result. The new economics simply used a new logic
to "verif[y] the classical view of labor unions as harmful political associ-
ations." Id.
229 Id. at 97. Peritz goes on to describe how the "imaginative distinc-
tions drawn between economic competition and political conflict," id.,
repeatedly were heightened by the invocation of exaggerated or baseless
claims of labor violence. See id. at 97-99.
230 Id. at 97.
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4. THE DIFFERING TREATMENT OF POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL
SPEECH Peritz stresses that in the early 20th century, the Court
was more receptive to government regulation of political activity
than of economic behavior. This tendency was reflected, for
example, in the Court's approach to free speech issues. Not only
was the Court generally more sympathetic to government regula-
tion of speech than it was to regulation of economic activity, but
speech that the Court treated as economic received substantially
greater judicial protection than speech that was deemed to be
political.2
31
Peritz stresses the severe limits of free speech doctrine prior to
the landmark series of First Amendment cases appearing in 1919
that established the "clear and present danger" test for govern-
ment regulation of speech. 232 The Court's free speech cases after
1918 and through the 1920s did not extend substantial new pro-
tection to political speech and did not display the same concern
for tyrannical majoritarianism that was so evident in the Court's
review of economic regulation.
233
Union speech in particular received little protection, says
Peritz, because the activities of unions, along with those of state
legislatures, were categorized as falling within a political sphere
distinct from the economic realm. The "verbal acts" of such
"political" associations were thought to endanger private property
and to pose the danger of "majoritarian tyranny." 234 On the other
hand, the Court took a very different and strikingly more tolerant
231 Id. at 100-04.
232 Id. at 101-03. Citing the Court's 1911 decision in Gompers v.
Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911), enjoining distribution
of an employer's name on a "don't patronize" list, Peritz notes that pre-
vailing doctrine equated speech with conduct, and dealt with it as a com-
mon law attempt or conspiracy to engage in banned conduct. Id. at 101.
As a result, says Peritz, the Court even allowed prior restraint of speech
when it had a "bad tendency" to produce some harm that the state legiti-
mately had a right to address under its police power.
233 Id. at 103.
234 Id. at 101.
Factionalfoundations : 307
approach to the "verbal acts" of trade associations as those associ-
ations came to be viewed more and more as efficiency-enhancing
economic organizations. The Court's 1925 opinion in Maple
Flooring thus downplayed the danger of price fixing posed by the
trade association activities challenged in that case and applauded
the potential benefits of broader communication of market infor-
mation. Peritz sees the case as an important indication that the
Court in this period generally saw commercial speech as less
threatening and more deserving of protection than political
speech.2
35
These developments in free speech case law, says Peritz, were
part of a much larger contemporary transformation in cultural atti-
tudes toward both economic and political speech. 236 The unprece-
dented and highly successful use of mass advertising to mobilize
support for America's participation in the First World War and to
sell war bonds on a massive scale greatly boosted the respectabil-
ity of mass advertising, which had originated in the late 19th cen-
tury. After the war, proponents of mass advertising built on this
new respectability and claimed that by molding public tastes such
advertising could overcome the economic cycles of rising and
falling demand. More broadly, advertising came to be seen as a
means to foster a democratic competition of economic ideas and
better informed choice by individual consumers. Advocates of
mass advertising went still further and proclaimed it as the anti-
dote to class thinking and political division and an effective pro-
moter of Americanization through "a common culture of
consumerism. ' 237 Thus, notes Peritz, while mass advertising had a
business mission, the rhetoric promoting it often was optimisti-
cally political.
238
235 Id. at 102.
236 Id. at 104-06.
237 Id. at 105.
238 Id. at 106.
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B. Assessing the conservative interlude between the classical
rule of reason and the beginning of the New Deal
1. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE TERMS OF DEBATE At the start
of Competition Policy in America 1888-1992, Peritz declares that
the congressional debates preceding enactment of the Sherman
Act "set the terms of debate over political economy in twentieth
century America."2 39 Except at a somewhat high level of general-
ity, however, it is far from clear from Peritz's narrative that com-
petition policy debates between 1911 and 1933 actually did
proceed in the terms of debate that Peritz depicts in his discussion
of the congressional deliberations and formative era case law.
Peritz stresses a number of broad continuities between devel-
opments before and after 1911. He notes that in the two decades
preceding the New Deal, as in the Progressive Era, some Justices
were relatively more concerned about private economic power and
private restraints on competition than were other Justices. Simi-
larly, he notes that some Justices were more wary of government
economic regulation than were other members of the High Court.
In addition, Peritz finds that broader political economic perspec-
tives played an influential role in the decades following as well as
preceding the Standard Oil and American Tobacco decisions. He
also finds that some of the major outlooks prominent before 1911
were among the broader perspectives playing an influential role in
later years.
Beyond such general parallels, however,240 Peritz's account
suggests as much novelty as continuity in competition policy
239 Id. at 5.
240 If Peritz has in mind little more than these general types of dis-
agreements and influences in referring to the relevant "terms of debate,"
it seems difficult to say that they originated in the Sherman Act debates
of 1888-1890. Ever since the United States was established, of course,
Americans have disagreed as to the appropriate extent of government
involvement in economic life and the proper balance and interrelation-
ship between private property rights and other community concerns
including the benefits attainable through competition. At the same time,
broader political economic perspectives have been influential in Ameri-
can thinking for at least as long. If Peritz largely has in mind these kinds
of general, long-recognized patterns, it is not entirely clear what is gained
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debate after 1911. Peritz does not argue that Supreme Court
jurisprudence between 1911 and 1933 continued to evolve as the
product of interaction between two great contending philosophical
factions embracing the same divergent visions and concerns that
he associates with the formative era Literalists and Rule of Rea-
sonists. That is, he does not contend that for two decades after
Standard Oil the Court was split into two major blocs, one of
which was vigorously committed to unrestrained competition and
strongly concerned about excessive private economic power, in
contrast to a second bloc which was less strongly committed to
competition, comparatively more committed to liberty of contract
and private property rights, and animated heavily by a fear of
social disintegration into atomistic warfare.
Indeed, Peritz does not strongly insist that the High Court after
1911 continuously was divided into two cohesive but warring
camps on the basis of any other pairing of alternative, comprehen-
sive visions of political economy either.241 Instead, he pictures a
by adopting a new terminology of competing "rhetorics" to refer to them.
If, alternatively, in noting the "terms of debate" for disagreements about
competition policy, Peritz means to refer to a much more specific coales-
cence of two sets of specific ideas and commitments along the lines he
pictures in discussing early congressional and Supreme Court thinking, it
becomes difficult to see strong continuity after 1911, for the reasons sug-
gested hereafter.
241 This changed interpretative focus is reflected partly in Peritz's
much less frequent invocation of the term "faction" in discussing post-
1911 developments as compared with earlier developments. At the same
time, when he does invoke the term in connection with the later period, it
is not always as clear whether he intends to refer to a grouping of Justices
within a single case, a grouping based on particular core attitudes con-
cerning competition and regulation, or a grouping of Justices according
to more general conservative or liberal leanings. For example, Peritz at
one point uses the term "faction" to refer specifically to the majority and
dissenting groups of Justices in Tyson Bros.-United Theatre Ticket
Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927). See PERrrz, supra note 1, at
74. In that case, Chief Justice Taft and Justices Sutherland, Butler,
McReynolds, and Van Devanter constituted the majority that struck down
the challenged price regulation, while Justices Brandeis, Holmes, San-
ford, and Stone dissented. At another point, Peritz labels as a separate
faction the Court majority that condemned particular data dissemination
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somewhat more complicated pattern of interaction among differ-
ing outlooks on competition, private economic power, freedom of
contract, private property rights and the limits of individualistic
rivalry. He finds that in certain settings and for certain Justices,
older, classical commitments to deductively applied principles of
freedom of contract and private property rights retained a power-
ful influence. In other settings or for other Justices, however,
newer perspectives, including utilitarian notions of property rights
and neoclassical conceptions of markets, exerted a simultaneous
and at times predominant influence.
For example, Peritz contends that by 1925 the Court adopted a
new Brandeisian rule of reason first announced in Board of Trade
of Chicago v. United States242 to govern antitrust adjudication in
place of the classical rule of reason announced in 1911.243 As
already noted, Peritz sees this new version of the rule of reason as
a judicial expression of neoclassical economics. 244 He does not,
however, find that neoclassical perspectives entirely displaced
other general political economic visions on the Court during the
arrangements in the early trade association cases. See id. at 86. In Ameri-
can Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), this
group included Chief Justice Taft and Justices Clarke, Day, McReynolds,
Pitney, and Van Devanter in opposition to dissenters Holmes, Brandeis
and McKenna. At a third point, Peritz declares that by 1925, when Maple
Flooring Manufacturers Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), was
decided, conservative and progressive factions on the Court joined
together to support a lenient antitrust approach to trade association data
dissemination activities. In this connection, Peritz goes on to associate
Justices Sutherland and McReynolds with the conservative faction and
Justices Brandeis, Holmes, and Stone with the progressive faction. See
id. at 81. In Maple Flooring, Justices Stone, Brandeis, Butler, Holmes,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter were in the majority while Chief Justice
Taft and Justices McReynolds and Sanford in fact dissented. For an indi-
cation of the Justices present on the Court when each of these cases was
decided, see THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 124, at 985-86.
242 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
243 He notes, however, that the turn to the Brandeisian rule of reason
was more apparent in trade association cases than in other antitrust con-
texts. PERITZ, supra note 1, at 80.
244 Id. at 88.
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1920s. 245 For instance, he finds that on some key antitrust issues
dividing the Court in the 1920s, conservative and progressive fac-
tions coalesced to support the same bottom line result on the
basis, respectively, of either an older, classical commitment to
freedom of contract and private property rights or a newer
embrace of utilitarian approaches to property entitlements.
246
Peritz also concludes that between 1911 and 1933, older and
newer perspectives sometimes exerted an alternating influence on
the thinking of individual Justices. For example, he sees a pre-
dominant influence of older, classical views in Brandeis' dissent
in American Column and Lumber.2 47 At the same time, he finds
Brandeis to have been a leading promoter of newer utilitarian
property rights approaches and neoclassical perspectives in his
1918 opinions in International News Service v. Associated
Press,248 and Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States.
249
Peritz highlights numerous important intellectual, practical,
and political changes influencing the evolution of antitrust law
between Standard Oil and the start of the New Deal. His discus-
sion appropriately and provocatively focuses attention on the rela-
tionship of antitrust developments to major contemporaneous
developments in the Supreme Court's treatment of public rate reg-
ulation, labor unions, and free speech issues. Peritz's account
offers a number of striking perspectives on legal developments
between 1911 and 1933 and helps to further understanding of those
developments as a transition between the legal and economic rea-
soning of the Progressive Era and that of the New Deal period.
As in other sections of his book, Peritz's discussion covers a
great deal of territory and raises numerous complicated issues
within the confines of a relatively brief discussion that is intended
245 See, e.g., id. at 76, 81.
246 See id. at 81.
247 See id. at 84.
248 248 U.S. 215, 248-67 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See
PERITZ, supra note 1, at 71-72.
249 246 U.S. 231 (1918). See PERrrz, supra note 1, at 78-80, 88.
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to be only one portion of a much broader study of competition
policy over the last 100 years. As already noted, this approach has
substantial virtues. At the same time, it has a perhaps inevitable
tendency sometimes to leave significant questions not fully
explored. The following sections seek to highlight certain specific
issues that seem deserving of some additional exploration, and
note some specific concerns, related to a series of major topics
that Peritz addresses in discussing competition policy between
1911 and 1933.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM, PUBLIC RATE REGULATION, AND
THE ILLEGALITY OF CARTELS On a number of occasions, Peritz
seems to overstate his case somewhat. For example, it is well
known that Supreme Court conservatism reached a high point
between the First World War and the New Deal.250 Nevertheless, it
is not quite the case that "the Supreme Court under Chief Justices
White and Taft was unrelenting in its protection of commercial
activity from legislative 'intervention.' "251 While the Court in the
1920s, for instance, struck down state legislation substantially
more often than it had during the preceding 20 years, the Court
still upheld most challenged state legislation, 252 just as it had dur-
ing the Progressive Era.25 3 Similarly, while the Court between
1911 and 1933 invalidated a number of important federal regula-
tory measures, 254 it also rejected challenges to the constitutionality
of other significant federal regulatory initiatives, even during the
conservative 1920s.255 For this and other reasons, it seems overly
250 See, e.g., KELLY ET AL., supra note 165, at 442-53.
251 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 66.
252 KELLY ET AL., supra note 165, at 452.
253 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
360-63 (2d ed. 1985); KELLY ET AL., supra note 165, at 405.
254 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Bailey v.
Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
255 See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922) (upholding the
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921); Railroad Commission of Wiscon-
sin v. Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Railroad Co., 257 U.S. 563
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strong to say, for instance, that the majority of Justices who voted
to strike down New York legislation regulating the prices charged
by theater ticket agents in Tyson Brothers-United Theatre Ticket
Offices, Inc. v. Banton256 conceived of the Constitution as "a lib-
eral document designed solely to protect private property from
political taking, a document with nothing to say about the conse-
quences of private economic power."
257
Peritz's depiction of the Court's stance toward public rate reg-
ulation and cartels in the 1920s presents a similar problem. Peritz
rightly points out that during that decade the Court established a
quite narrow category of firms subject to rate regulation as "busi-
nesses affected with a public interest." He goes on to assert, how-
ever, that the Court in the 1920s declared public price regulation
of companies outside this narrow category to be "illegal per se"
25 8
along with private cartel activity.
Technically, of course, the Court declared public rate regula-
tion of "ordinary" firms to be constitutionally invalid rather than
literally illegal. The more important issue, however, is Peritz's
treatment of the antitrust status of cartels in this period. The Court
addressed this question most directly in the 1927 case of United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co.259 Peritz pictures that decision as a
landmark reiteration of what he sees as a pillar of competition
(1922) (upholding the Transportation Act of 1920 granting expanded rate
regulation power to the Interstate Commerce Commission).
256 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
257 PERrrz, supra note 1, at 75. All of the Justices voting in the major-
ity in Tyson Brothers-United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton who
also had been on the Court in 1921 voted to approve antitrust condemna-
tion of the collective exercise of private economic power in American
Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). These Jus-
tices were Chief Justice Taft and Justices McReynolds and Van Devanter.
Both Taft and McReynolds also voted, in dissent, to condemn as a Sher-
man Act violation the trade association activity approved in Maple Floor-
ing Manufacturers Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 586-87.
258 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 72, 90. See also id. at 74.
259 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
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policy since the early years of the 20th century: unanimous
Supreme Court per se condemnation of private price-fixing agree-
ments.2 60 Trenton Potteries, however, was not in fact a unanimous
decision. Justices Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter all dis-
sented while Justice Brandeis did not participate in decision of the
case.261 In addition, it is far from indisputable that Justice Stone's
opinion for the Court in Trenton Potteries actually "found private
price-fixing illegal regardless of intent and competitive effect."2 62
3. THE NATURE AND GROWING INFLUENCE OF NEOCLASSICAL ECO-
NOMICS A major focus of Peritz's discussion of the 1911 to 1933
period is the growing influence within antitrust law of broad
developing changes in economic theory. Peritz argues that new
neoclassical economic perspectives based on a functional exami-
nation of markets instead of a deductive application of freedom of
contract principles263 played an influential role in Supreme Court
jurisprudence as early as the Court's 1920 opinion in United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp.2 64 He also declares that neoclassical eco-
nomic perspectives informed the new Brandeisian rule of reason
that he finds the Court adopted in antitrust cases by 1925 in place
of the older classical rule of reason established in 1911.265
Peritz's brief discussion of the nature of early 20th-century
neoclassical economics leaves open a series of questions that
260 See PERITZ, supra note 1, at 73 (referring to the "Court's unani-
mous decision in Trenton Potteries").
261 See 273 U.S. at 407.
262 PERrrz, supra note 1, at 73. Specifically, the case can be read nar-
rowly to establish an approach applicable only when the cartel partici-
pants enjoy a large collective share of the market in which they operate.
See 273 U.S. at 394, 396, 398. Peritz acknowledges this in his earlier
writing but omits mention of it in his new book. For his earlier mention
of this alternative reading of the case and its relevance for a per se char-
acterization of the opinion, see Peritz, Counter-History, supra note 4, at
287 n.94.
263 See PERITZ, supra note 1, at 79, 88.
264 251 U.S. 417 (1920). See PRmTZ, supra note 1, at 67.
26S See PERITz, supra note 1, at 78-80, 88.
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profitably might be explored at greater length. For example, in
practice, how thoroughly and radically did the thinking of persons
associated with early 20th-century American neoclassical eco-
nomics actually depart from more traditional economic perspec-
tives? To what extent and in what ways did early academic or
popular variants of "neoclassical" thinking in early 20th-century
America incorporate various major aspects of earlier economic
thinking within their own analyses, even while moving beyond
them in other respects?
Second, when is it safe to conclude that a particular Supreme
Court opinion reveals its author's knowledge and acceptance of
neoclassical economics? For instance, how compelling is it to
infer, as Peritz at times does, that if a given Supreme Court opin-
ion after the First World War focused on market conduct and
effects rather than stressing general freedom of contract rhetoric,
the Justice writing the opinion must have embraced neoclassical
rather than classical economic perspectives?
266
266 See, e.g., id. at 67, 79 (asserting a neoclassical economic basis for
Justice McKenna's opinion in U.S. Steel); 88 (declaring that the new
Brandeisian rule of reason first announced in Board of Trade of Chicago
v. United States (1918) was "a juridical reformulation of neoclassical
economics and its focus on markets rather than individual freedom of
contract"). The fact that a particular focus may have been consistent with
a neoclassical outlook, of course, does not necessarily mean that it might
not also have been adopted by someone with a more traditional general
economic orientation. Persons with a "pre-neoclassical" outlook as well
as those thoroughly imbued with neoclassical perspectives thought it
sometimes was important to consider the actual effects of particular con-
duct and the dynamics of particular markets. It would seem difficult for
Peritz to argue that the absence of an explicitly articulated emphasis on
freedom of contract principles indicates the abandonment of a firm com-
mitment to them. In his discussion of the congressional debates preceding
passage of the Sherman Act, for example, Peritz argues that one of two
great congressional factions dominating the debates embraced a central
commitment to such principles in contrast to the opposing faction's cen-
tral commitment to full and free competition, even though he finds no
instances in which members of the former "faction" actually ever
invoked general freedom of contract principles explicitly. See id., at 18.
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Third, how clearly does the Court's opinion in U.S. Steel
reflect not only the influence but also the inadequacies of neoclas-
sical analyses of concentrated markets? Peritz notes that Justice
McKenna's opinion for the Court in U.S. Steel required a showing
of a very high market share to establish a completed offense of
monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.267 Peritz
associates this stance with neoclassical economic thought, in
which, he says, "markets were understood categorically as either
competitive or monopolistic. . . . [A]nything short of complete
market control was treated as competitive." 268 Did economists
such as John B. Clark literally believe that any markets not occu-
pied entirely by a single firm with 100 percent of the trade, but
instead dominated, for example, by a firm enjoying merely a 90 or
95 percent market share should be deemed functionally equivalent
to a market involving atomistic competition among a hundred
small sellers? The strength of this claim might be furthered con-
siderably if Peritz cited at least one piece of early neoclassical
writing that directly articulated such a position.
4. THE LOGIC OF THE CONTRASTING TREATMENT OF TRADE AND LABOR
ASSOCIATIONS Another central theme in Peritz's discussion of the
period between 1911 and 1933 is the Supreme Court's sharply
contrasting treatment of trade and labor associations. As Peritz
notes, the Court issued a series of decisions in the 1920s that
strongly restricted the scope of labor union activity. After 1925,
however, the Court displayed a much more tolerant attitude
toward trade association activity of the sort challenged in Maple
Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United States. 269 Peritz
sees such differing treatment as a central aspect of competition
policy between the First World War and the New Deal; and he
persuasively argues that general political concerns and values
strongly influenced its development.
Peritz relates the Court's approach not only to specific politi-
cal value preferences, but also to more general ongoing changes
267 See id., at 67.
268 Id.
269 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
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in intellectual thought. He suggests that "[i]t seems logical to
have anticipated that, like trade associations, labor associations
would be judged more leniently under the new Rule of Reason,
because they would be viewed as economic activities in the pri-
vate domain." 270 Peritz finds, however, that "elite lawyers and
economists, federal judges and Republican administrations" were
able to justify an opposite result. They did so, he says, by adopt-
ing "a common imaginative framework" that treated labor unions
as physically threatening political factions rather than as eco-
nomic organizations competing with employers.
27'
Peritz's view raises, among other issues, a question as to why
any new intellectual outlook was needed to justify differing treat-
ment for trade and labor associations. To what extent did sympa-
thy for trade association data dissemination in fact logically call
into question continued hostility to union activities in pursuit of
higher wages? Was the Court's less sympathetic treatment of
union efforts as compared with trade association activities so
inherently inconsistent with previously prevailing economic logic
that it necessitated the development of a new "imaginative frame-
work"? Granted that the Court's treatment of labor and trade asso-
ciations was strikingly inconsistent in spirit and that conservative
political leanings largely accounted for the difference, was there
really not enough flexibility in the old imaginative framework to
permit "logical" justification of the Court's approach?
Traditional observers already perceived various forms of coop-
erative activity as beneficial behavior distinguishable from naked
cartel activity. Approval of particular, newly prominent forms of
collective activity alongside condemnation of other conduct
would seem readily possible within a traditional, pre-neoclassical
frame of reference, as long as one was willing to conclude that the
condemned conduct was the equivalent of harmful cartel activity
while the approved behavior was not. It was not difficult for con-
servative observers either in the 1920s or earlier to adopt exactly
270 PEarrz, supra note 1, at 89.
271 Id. at 90.
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this approach to condemn union efforts in pursuit of higher wages
while approving trade association data dissemination schemes, at
least when such schemes were found not to involve any collective
agreement to raise prices or reduce output.
5. PERCEPTIONS OF LABOR UNIONS AS THREATENING POLITICAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS SHARPLY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM ECONOMICALLY EFFICIENT
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS Whether or not it was logically necessary,
did key actors in the 1920s in fact adopt a new "imaginative
framework" justifying harsh treatment of labor unions alongside
lenient treatment of trade associations? Peritz insists that they did.
Specifically, he asserts that Supreme Court Justices and others in
the 1920s embraced a new intellectual framework in which col-
lective labor efforts to obtain higher wages were believed to raise
political but not economic issues. In making this argument, he
points to three conceptual developments fostering an image of
labor associations as dangerous political organizations sharply
distinguishable from trade associations. In particular, he stresses:
ongoing characterizations of organized labor as physically threat-
ening to persons and property; new, "horizontalized" conceptions
of competition within neoclassical economics; and the Supreme
Court's selective application of classical cartel doctrine in the
1920s.
Peritz's portrayal of the ongoing influence of the first of these
factors is persuasive. The impact of the second two factors seems
less certain, however, for the following reasons.
a. The neoclassical "horizontalization" of competition As
already noted, Peritz connects the disparate treatment of labor and
trade associations in the 1920s to what he sees as a fundamental
difference between classical and neoclassical economics. He
argues that with the rise of neoclassical economics, an older,
undifferentiatedly two-dimensional conception of competition
became "horizontalized." In consequence, he contends, labor
efforts to secure higher wages came to be viewed as vertical,
political conduct rather than horizontal, economic activity.
272
272 See id. at 95-96.
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In making this point, Peritz reiterates a characterization of
19th-century economic thinking that he briefly also asserts in dis-
cussing Progressive Era antitrust jurisprudence. In analyzing the
early railroad cartel cases, for example, Peritz contends that "clas-
sical political economy made no distinction between horizontal
and vertical dimensions. Competition was understood as both ver-
tical and horizontal, as involving rivalry not only among sellers
but also between buyers and sellers. ' 273 Similarly, in discussing
the Court's 1911 resale price maintenance decision in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,274 Peritz notes that
In more recent times, we have tended to think of competition only as a
horizontal phenomenon and hence we separate commercial conduct
into horizontal and vertical dimensions. Classical economics, how-
ever, made no such distinction. Competition was understood as entail-
ing rivalry not only between two patent medicine makers (horizontal)
but also between a manufacturer and its retailers (vertical). In conse-
quence, no one on the Court blinked at citing the cartel cases as prece-
dent.275
Did 19th- and early 20th-century classical economic thinkers
really make "no distinction" between horizontal and vertical
rivalry? Did neoclassical economic analysts in the 1920s really
come to see efforts to secure higher wages "as a question of poli-
tics rather than a question of economics"?
276
The answer to both questions would appear to be no.
It is true that in some 19th-century classical economic writing,
"competition" was used to refer partly or even primarily to verti-
cal relationships, especially the relations between employers and
employees. 277 Thus, for example, Amasa Walker declared that
labor and capital are "competitors" and that the "competition of
273 Id. at 34.
274 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
275 PERrrz, supra note 1, at 54.
276 Id. at 96.
277 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American
Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEX. L. REv. 919, 936 (1988).
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labor and capital never ceases; but it respects the bond of union in
which only each has its own full development. '" 278 In general,
however, when classical economic writers described a natural
economic world of unimpeded production and exhange in which
the disparate interests of consumers, capital, and labor all were
coordinated and ultimately harmonized through the operation of
the powerful and pervasive natural law of competition, they not
only distinguished between vertical and horizontal rivalry, but
stressed primarily the latter. At the heart of their thinking was the
faith that, as long as individuals were not impeded in their free
pursuit of economic opportunity, abnormally high prices and
returns temporarily prevailing in any particular market would
attract new entrants. Such new entry, they believed, would expand
available supply, intensify competition among sellers, and force
prices downward until supply and demand once again naturally
achieved an equilibrium generating fair, normal prices and
returns. 279
Francis Bowen, for example, explained that
if the gains in one department of enterprise are notoriously above the
average,-if it is even suspected by a multitude of sharp-sighted
observers, who are on the lookout for such opportunities, that they
exceed the average,-more capital is at once attracted into the employ-
ment, till, by the competition of the capitalists with each other, the rate
of Profit is reduced to the common standard in other enterprises. 280
Similarly, Simon Newcomb declared that "If the makers [of an
article] charge too much for it, other makers will compete and
thus lower the price." 281 In the same vein, Henry Wood declared
278 AMASA WALKER, THE SCIENCE OF WEALTH: A MANUAL OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY. EMBRACING THE LAWS OF TRADE, CURRENCY, AND FINANCE 21 (7th
ed. 1874).
279 For an extended discussion of classical economic thinking and its
relationship to political liberalism, laissez-faire constitutionalism, and
early antitrust law, see May, supra note 54, at 262-309.
280 FRANCIS BOWEN, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY APPLIED TO
THE CONDITION, THE RESOURCES, AND THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE 241 (3d ed. 1863) (emphasis added).
281 SIMON NEWCOMB, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 448 (1886).
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that competition in the business world consisted "either in giving
a better article at the same price, or as good a one for less."
282
Indeed, the perceived importance of horizontal competition,
understood to be distinct in nature and importance from vertical
rivalry despite the fact that such rivalry also at times was referred
to as a form of "competition," led at least one leading late 19th-
century writer to stress the horizontal rather than vertical charac-
ter of competition in the specific context of relations between
labor and capital. Thus, Julian M. Sturtevant emphasized that "It
should . . . be borne in mind, that the competition that deter-
mines wages . . . is the competition of labor with labor, and not
of labor with capital."
283
In concluding that classical economics did not distinguish
between vertical and horizontal dimensions of economic rivalry,
Peritz cites almost no writing by classical economists them-
selves.284 Instead, he primarily relies on Holmes' dissenting opin-
ions in Dr. Miles and in the earlier Massachusetts high court case
of Vegelahn v. Guntner.285 It seems somewhat ironic, however, to
rely on those dissenting opinions to demonstrate that orthodox
thought failed to distinguish between horizontal and vertical eco-
nomic rivalry. In his famous 1896 dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner,
Holmes explicitly acknowledged the long-standing policy in favor
of horizontal business competition.28 6 He went on to concede that
282 HENRY WOOD, THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF NATURAL LAW 36 (1894).
283 JULIAN M. STURTEVANT, ECONOMICS OR THE SCIENCE OF WEALTH 158
(1877) (emphasis in original).
284 The only passage from classical economic writing that he quotes
to support his conclusion that classical economists made no distinction
between vertical and horizontal rivalry is a statement from Francis
Walker's Political Economy defining competition as "the operation of
individual self-interest, among buyers and sellers." See PERITZ, supra
note 1, at 34 (quoting FRANCIS A. WALKER, POLITICAL ECONOMY 262 (3d
ed. 1888)).
285 167 Mass. 92, 104-09, 44 N.E. 1077, 1079-82 (1896) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
286 167 Mass. at 106-07, 44 N.E. at 1080-81 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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some people believed that the vertical rivalry between employers
and workers could not similarly be deemed "competition." Pre-
cisely for this reason he suggested that such vertical rivalry might
be referred to as the "free struggle for life" rather than "free com-
petition."287 In his dissent in Dr. Miles, Holmes did use the phrase
"the competition of conflicting desires" in arguing that prices pro-
duced by even a monopolist should be deemed to be fair because
they represented an equilibrium point between the wishes of the
seller and those of the buyers.288 In doing so, however, Holmes
expressly acknowledged the unorthodoxy of his own thinking on
competition and noted the more conventional, horizontally-
focused meaning of "competition" embraced by his colleagues on
the bench.
289
287 167 Mass. at 107, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
288 220 U.S. 373, 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
289 Holmes declared: "I am in the minority as to larger issues than are
concerned here. I think that we greatly exaggerate the value and impor-
tance to the public of competition in the production or distribution of an
article. . . as fixing a fair price." 220 U.S. at 411-12 (Holmes, J., dis-
senting). As noted previously, Peritz also points to the majority opinion
in Dr. Miles as confirmation of his view of classical conceptions of com-
petition. Peritz sees Dr. Miles as a case in which the majority condemned
resale price maintenance agreements per se in substantial part because the
Court already had established such treatment for cartels and was influ-
enced by classical economic thought to see no difference between hori-
zontal and vertical dimensions of rivalry. See PERrrz, supra note 1, at 54.
This would be a stronger argument if the Court had expressed objection
to resale price maintenance because of its effect in dimming rivalry or
"competition" between the manufacturer and its affected dealers. In actu-
ality, however, the Court repeatedly declared that its main reason for con-
demning the system of resale price maintenance contracts involved in the
case was that the contracts would have the same effect as a cartel among
the dealers, the most classic of restraints on horizontal competition. It
therefore seems hard to read the case as a strong general expression of
equal concern for diminished rivalry between a seller and buyers, on the
one hand, and among sellers on the same level in a chain of distribution,
on the other. For a more extended discussion of Dr. Miles, relating the
opinion to the broader context of contemporary political and economic
thought and suggesting possible problems with reading the case to estab-
lish a rule of per se illegality for resale price maintenance agreements,
see May, supra note 54, at 389-91.
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While Peritz underemphasizes classical distinctions between
horizontal and vertical rivalry, he simultaneously overemphasizes
the contrast between horizontal and vertical in neoclassical eco-
nomics. Peritz notes that between 1911 and 1933, neoclassical
economists saw unions as anticompetitive combinations whose
activities increased wages and reduced output. He goes on to
declare, however, that within neoclassical economics "vertical
rivalry between buyers and sellers became a 'political' question of
bargaining power, of wealth distribution." 290 Peritz does not sim-
ply assert that vertical rivalry between employers and employees
was perceived to have strong political as well as economic over-
tones. Instead, he declares more strongly that with the coming of
neoclassical economics, "[p]olitical economy was effectively par-
titioned into vertical and horizontal planes, into economic and
political domains." 291 As a result, he says, battles over wages
came to be viewed as "a question of redistributing wealth between
classes rather than a question of efficiency, as a question of poli-
tics rather than a question of economics."
292
It is true that 20th-century neoclassical economics strongly
has sought to limit its focus to issues of efficiency and to avoid
normative judgments about the distribution of wealth. This, how-
ever, does not mean that interactions between buyers and sellers
or the vertical impact of market power exercised by actors at any
particular level in a distribution chain ever ceased to be seen as
phenomena still very much within the economic realm and impor-
tant continuing objects of economic analysis.
Peritz declares that the interplay of the conflicting desires of
buyers and sellers in the labor context was no longer seen as
''a question of economics" because neoclassical economics
deemed vertical rivalry to raise issues of wealth distribution
falling within the political rather than economic domain. Resolu-
tion of the conflicting desires of buyers and sellers, whether in
business or labor contexts, of course, does have distributional
290 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 95.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 96.
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consequences. Collective efforts either by laborers or by the sell-
ers of various commodities may well force affected buyers to pay
more than they otherwise would for labor services or goods. Such
effects certainly can be assessed in terms of their perceived "polit-
ical" desirability. At the same time, however, such vertical inter-
actions and effects have efficiency implications as well. The fact
that neoclassical economists have stressed the efficiency rather
than distributional consequences of lessened supply and higher
prices resulting from the collective activity of sellers of either
labor services or goods does not indicate that they thereby have
limited themselves to concern for effects and activity confined to
a "horizontal plane" or that they have treated interlevel interaction
and effects as falling exclusively into a political realm outside the
borders of their own field.
b. The selective application of classical cartel doctrine
Peritz suggests that a political characterization of labor associa-
tions, in contrast with the economic conceptualization of trade
associations, was furthered significantly by the Supreme Court's
selective application of cartel doctrine in the 1920s. He notes that
while, the Court earlier had applied "classical cartel doctrine" to
declare "both labor and trade associations illegal per se," 293 the
Court by the middle of the 1920s no longer applied this doctrine
to trade associations, even though it did continue to apply it to
organized labor. This does not lead Peritz simply to conclude that
for antitrust purposes union activities still were treated as danger-
ous economic behavior analogous to cartels among rival busi-
nesses. Instead, Peritz strongly associates "classical cartel
doctrine" in the 1920s with the political realm. He declares that
by the middle of the 1920s, the Court had decided that labor, but
not trade, organizations "would be viewed under the classical
Rule of Reason, its liberty of contract logic, and its common-law
cartel doctrine otherwise reserved for state price-fixing. '294 As a
293 Id. at 92.
294 Id. at 93. See also id. at 90 (similarly noting that "labor associa-
tions were still judged according to the classical cartel doctrine otherwise
reserved for illegitimate political action").
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result, he says, "[ilike public price-fixing, labor union activities
were illegal per se.
' 295
Peritz's argument again seems a bit too sharply drawn. For
example, despite its markedly conservative leanings, the Court
never treated labor associations as "illegal per se," either in the
1920s or in the preceding decades. The Court also never con-
demned all collective activities undertaken by unions to raise
wages or improve working conditions, 296 even though it did
greatly restrict the range of tactics left open to organized labor
during the 1920s. 297 In addition, when the Court condemned par-
ticular tactics on the part of organized labor, the Court's opinions
did not compare such tactics to illegitimate government rate regu-
lation, but did at times explicitly analogize them to private busi-
ness conduct that previously had been found to violate the
Sherman Act.
298
6. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SPEECH Peritz concludes his exami-
nation of the 1920s by connecting the political conceptions of
unions that he finds to have been prevalent in that decade to the
broader developing pattern of First Amendment law. He persua-
sively notes that contemporary beliefs that labor strikes and
295 Id. at 90.
296 For example, writing for the Court in American Steel Foundries v.
Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), Chief Justice Taft
affirmed, in speaking of collective efforts to withhold labor in order to
secure higher wages, that "[t]he right to combine for such a lawful pur-
pose has in many years not been denied by any court. The strike became
a lawful instrument in a lawful economic struggle or competition
between employer and employees as to the share or division between
them of the joint product of labor and capital." Id. at 209.
297 See, e.g., KELLY ET AL., supra note 165, at 449-50.
298 See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 467
(1921); Bedford Cut Stone Company v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Asso-
ciation of North America, 274 U.S. 37, 54 (1927). In both of these cases,
the Court relied on Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v.
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914), which had condemned under the
Sherman Act a boycott by retailers against wholesale suppliers who also
made retail sales.
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boycotts were more dangererous than trade association informa-
tion exchange programs led to markedly different treatment of
labor and trade associations in First Amendment as well as
antitrust contexts. In addition, Peritz thoughtfully relates this pat-
tern to other major developments concerning commercial and
political speech between 1911 and 1933. As already noted, he par-
ticularly highlights the rise and expanding application of mass
advertising and the changing cultural justifications for it. This
illuminating analysis leads directly into Peritz's introductory dis-
cussion of several key intellectual developments that helped to
usher in the dramatic changes in political economic thought, gov-
ernment regulation, and legal doctrine occurring in the 1930s.
IV. The bridge to postclassical economics, the New Deal,
and modern political economy: Chamberlin, Schumpeter,
and Berle and Means on the new economy
and the modern corporation
Peritz finds that despite its substantial influence during the
1920s, neoclassical economics failed to provide an explanation
for the rise of mass advertising and the activities of trade associa-
tions. Neoclassical premises, he points out, conflicted with the
advertising faith that consumers were influenced by more than
just price in deciding what to buy. In addition, the systematic
cooperative activities of trade associations appeared to violate
neoclassical theory's "exclusive logic of competition."2 99 The new
pervasiveness of concentrated markets, moreover, belied the neo-
classical assumption of a world in which markets either were
purely competitive or were dominated by a single monopolist.
Peritz notes, however, that in the wake of the Great Crash
of 1929, two new "paradigm-shattering books" appeared that
would fundamentally reshape discourse about economics and
competition policy for decades to come.3°° These two books were:
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means' 1932 classic, The Modern
299 PERITZ, supra note 1, at 106.
300 Id. at 107.
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Corporation and Private Property, and Edward H. Chamberlin's
1933 book, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition.
The latter book, notes Peritz, provided powerful new general
explanations for the dynamics of the real-world markets that neo-
classical economics had failed to explain:
Chamberlin's oligopoly theory introduced an economic logic of
cooperation to explain the lack of price competition in industries with
few firms as well as those with trade associations-that is, industries
organized to act as though they were oligopolies. His theory of
monopolistic competition introduced a new economic logic of rivalry
to explain mass advertising and, more generally, the alternatives to
price competition in industries with many firms.301
While Chamberlin, however, decried the proliferation of monopo-
listic competition by way of product advertising, finding much of
it to be mere "useless differentiation," his Harvard mentor Joseph
A. Schumpeter 9 years later, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democ-
racy, would herald the proliferation of products as simply one part
of the constant process of innovation, the "perennial gale of cre-
ative destruction," that constantly undercut monopoly and kept
capitalism vital.
302
Peritz notes that the year before Chamberlin's book appeared,
Berle and Means published their own revolutionary and highly
influential departure from neoclassical analysis, The Modern Cor-
poration and Private Property. Peritz stresses that Berle and
Means did not simply conclude that ownership had come to be
separated from control in the large modem corporation. They also
found, he says, that the cooperative dynamics of modem concen-
trated industries had in a great many instances replaced the vigor-
ous marketplace competition that otherwise might have pushed
managers effectively to maximize corporate returns. In addition,
Peritz relates, Berle and Means emphasized the nature of the mod-
em corporation as a complex web of public interests and private
rights that appropriately should be administered by a "neutral
technocracy" of industrial and social engineers. This last empha-
301 Id. at 108.
302 See id. at 109.
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sis, notes Peritz, provided a strong theoretical foundation for the
legislative initiatives of the early New Deal.
Peritz believes the appearance of these new works constituted
a major watershed in 20th-century approaches to competition pol-
icy: "The discourse of postclassical economics, with eye-opening
concepts such as oligopoly, monopolistic competition, innovation,
and corporate control, not only unlocked a rhetorical gateway to
the New Deal but also expanded the boundaries of modem com-
petition policy for the remainder of the century."303
V. Conclusion: the strengths and limits of a rhetorical
history of competition policy in America
The remaining two-thirds of Competition Policy in America
1888-1992 explores developments during the six decades after
Chamberlin and Berle and Means published their pathbreaking
books. In these later chapters, Peritz takes note of a great many spe-
cific changes over time in the economic, political, social, theoretical,
and polemical contexts within which competition policy evolved.
Notwithstanding such changes, Peritz ultimately concludes
that competition policy from the New Deal to the 1990s funda-
mentally continued to be shaped by interaction between the same
two "twin rhetorics of free competition," the same two "clusters
of images and arguments," 304 that he believes dominated competi-
tion policy development from 1888 to 1933. Both before the New
Deal and ever since, says Peritz, one of these two profoundly
influential rhetorics continually has embraced a primary ethical
commitment to individual liberty and heavily has emphasized
freedom from government power. Simultaneously, Peritz believes,
the other influential rhetoric continually has embraced a primary
ethical commitment to rough equality and has placed compar-
atively greater emphasis on competition freed from inordinate
private economic power.
305
303 Id. at 110.
304 Id. at 301.
305 Id.
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The sections of Competition Policy in America 1888-1992
that focus on the decades from the passage of the Sherman Act to
the start of the New Deal provide an important part of the founda-
tion for this new interpretation of competition policy as a whole
since the 1880s. For the reasons already noted, some of Peritz's
major conclusions in these sections seem distinctly more convinc-
ing than do others. Partly, this is due simply to the fact that the
book's sweeping coverage necessitated relatively compact treat-
ments of some very complex topics that did not permit all signifi-
cant questions to be explored at length. More fundamentally,
however, Peritz's thoroughgoing depiction of competition policy
as the product of ongoing interaction between the two twin
"rhetorics" just noted repeatedly appears to be contradicted,
sometimes rather sharply, by prominent aspects of the historical
record. Notwithstanding these limitations, however, Competition
Policy in America 1888-1992 is an important contribution.
Peritz's basic interpretative approach is a form of structuralist
intellectual history. While such an approach has been relatively
rare in writing on antitrust history, this variety of intellectual his-
tory has been the focus of considerable scholarly attention over
the last 25 years in connection with other major historical
issues. 306 Indeed, the scholarly literature consisting of works either
seeking to pursue such an approach or critiquing it has become
quite voluminous in recent years, even as the specific varieties of
strongly or softly "structuralist" approaches have proliferated.
Peritz characterizes his own work as primarily an adaptation
and application of the work of Michel Foucault. 30 7 He also notes a
general connection, however, between his own work and the great
outpouring of recent "rhetorical history" addressing republicanism
and liberalism in many periods and phases of American life.30 8 In
the latter setting, scholars have devoted particularly great atten-
tion over the last several years to the possibilities and limitations
of "rhetorical history" in general.
306 See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 191.
307 See PERrrz, supra note 1, at 306 n.7.
308 Id.
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Within that literature, for example, scholars have engaged in
intensive debates about the meaning of and possible differences
among, "paradigms," "ideologies," "languages" and "rhetorics"
and have disagreed as to which, if any of these should be
embraced as an appropriate interpretative emphasis in various spe-
cific contexts or in general. 309 Recent writing has suggested not
only benefits but also potential difficulties in perceiving of intel-
lectual thought in terms of rhetorics or languages of discourse. A
number of scholars, for instance, have expressed doubts as to how
sharply "republicanism" and "liberalism" can be separated from
one another as influential general perspectives. Questions also
have been raised as to whether the thought of particular individu-
als involved in important historical struggles such as the
1787-1788 debates over constitutional ratification plausibly can
be understood as reflecting one and only one of these two bodies
of thought or of speech. 310 In addition, some scholars have argued
recently that still other general rhetorics or ideologies played an
influential role in important periods of American history along
with republicanism and liberalism.311 At the same time, however,
other writers have expressed basic reservations about interpreting
intellectual thought strongly in terms of paradigmatic rhetorics,
no matter how numerous. A growing number of historians, for
example, have stressed that the categories of "republicanism" and
"liberalism" are constructs developed by modem historians rather
than discrete languages that individual historical actors ever spoke
in exclusively or, indeed, even recognized to have a separate
existence.312
309 See Rodgers, supra note 191, at 21-22.
310 See, e.g., Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal
and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic, 43 WILLiAM & MARY
Q. 3, 12 (1986); James Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Chris-
tianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Dis-
course, 74 J. AM. HIST. 20 (1987); Rodgers, supra note 191, at 35.
311 See, e.g., KRAMNICK, supra note 191, at 260-88.
312 See, e.g., Rodgers, supra note 191, at 36-37; Wood, supra note
191, at 158.
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Peritz's work connects the highly important realm of Ameri-
can competition policy since the late 1880s to this rich current of
recent scholarship on American intellectual thought. In so doing,
his work opens up a substantial range of methodological as well
as substantive issues for productive, ongoing exploration for a
long time to come.
Would it have been possible for Peritz or anyone else to write
a rhetorical history of the last 100 years of competition policy that
did not generate scholarly disagreements or questions about possi-
ble oversimplification? The experience of the last 25 years of
scholarly writing on intellectual history suggests very strongly
that the answer to this question is no.
This does not mean that this type of approach to historical
interpretation is not valuable. Quite the opposite is true. It is,
however, in the nature of even the very best of such "structuralist"
histories that they tend to promote vigorous scholarly debate and
discussion about important aspects of American experience.
Peritz's prodigious, densely packed, and sweeping new study
makes precisely such a contribution while simultaneously offering
a host of valuable, specific insights concerning the history of
competition policy in America over the last hundred years.
No one else, indeed, has even attempted to create what Peritz
has written, an interpretative history of the entire, long story of
competition policy since the 1880s, focusing not only on antitrust
law but on constitutional law, labor law, corporate law, First
Amendment jurisprudence, and other substantive areas within an
ever changing political, economic, and theoretical context.
Peritz's effort is formidable and his approach continually innova-
tive. His sometimes disputable but invariably thought-provoking
book is one that should be read and considered energetically by
anyone interested either in the long-run story of competition pol-
icy in America or in the history of American law more generally
from the late 19th century to the present.
